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Investment? 
Timothy Webster* 
Abstract: Conventional wisdom portrays the United States as open to foreign invest-
ment. This Article challenges that narrative by examining key moments when the U.S. 
government has not welcomed foreign investment. First, it shows that Anti-Asian senti-
ment has spurred the creation of U.S. investment law over the past forty years. Second, 
it attributes this concern about Asian investment to outmoded paradigms about Asia. 
Third, it shows fear of Asia may have also influenced government decision-making, and 
may continue in the foreseeable future. Finally, it prescribes solutions that state ac-
tors—judicial, executive, legislative—can take to ensure that government decisions are 
motivated by proper concerns. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
In July 2014, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found that President 
Obama violated the due process rights of Ralls, a Delaware company owned 
by two Chinese nationals.1 Ralls had acquired four wind farms in northern 
 
 1  Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The case is extraordinary for 
a couple of reasons. First, many believed that Ralls had no right to contest the decision of the Obama 
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Oregon, one of which was located within restricted airspace of the U.S. 
Navy.2 Six months after the acquisition, President Obama, acting on the rec-
ommendation of the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States, ordered Ralls to divest the wind farms. President Obama cited 
unspecified but “credible evidence that . . . Ralls . . . might take action . . . to 
impair the national security of the United States . . . .”3 Unfortunately, Ralls 
did not have access to that evidence. 
The President’s refusal to share certain unclassified evidence with Ralls, 
and consequent failure to provide Ralls an opportunity to rebut that evidence, 
violated its due process rights.4 Hundreds of other wind turbines were located 
nearby, many within the Navy’s airspace.5 As the court pointed out, many of 
these turbines were both “foreign-made and foreign-owned.”6 It seems un-
likely then, that the divestiture order was motivated solely by the fact of for-
eign ownership or control.7 A fuller explanation would take note of the fact 
that the owners were Chinese. As this Article demonstrates, anti-Asian ani-
mus informs government policy and decision-making at the highest levels.8 
More specifically, this Article probes the intriguing but unexamined is-
sue of why the U.S. government has resisted Asian investment.9 Investment 
law and policy are not disciplines frequently mined for anti-Asian bias. In-
deed, the prevailing wisdom about U.S. investment policy is its putative 
openness to foreigners, both externally (the United States pushes other coun-
tries to lower their barriers to investment), and internally (the United States 
retains one of the most open investment policies of any modern state). Nev-
ertheless, this Article marshals evidence, from the 1970s to the present, of 
hostility to investment from three main sources: the Middle East, China, and 
Japan. Drawing on congressional testimony, government investigations, 
 
administration in the first place. Second, few expected that the appellate court would side with the plain-
tiffs, and force the administration to reveal unclassified evidence about the national security threat of the 
wind farms.  
 2  Id. at 300. 
 3  Order Regarding the Acquisition of Four U.S. Wind Farm Project Companies by Ralls Corporation, 
77 Fed. Reg. 60,281 (Oct. 3, 2012). 
 4  Ralls, 758 F.3d at 319. 
 5  A detailed map of the area is available online through the Canadian newspaper Globe and Mail. See 
Too Close for Comfort, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/ 
report-on-business/too-close-for-comfort/article4590399/?from=4590246. 
 6  Ralls, 758 F.3d at 305. 
 7  Id. Indeed, one of the prior owners of the wind farms was a Greek-owned corporation based in 
Delaware.  
 8  See infra Part I.B. 
 9  This Article views Asia expansively, as a geographical region extending from the Middle East 
(Saudi Arabia and Gulf States) to East Asia (China and Japan). This interpretation may not conform to 
prevailing notions of Asia as “East Asia” or even “South Asia and East Asia.” But proper geography is 
not the only redeeming feature of this conception of Asia. It also takes account of the long history of 
Orientalism—discourses that ascribe certain motivations, behaviors and values to Asian people. Part III.A 
explains Orientalism in detail. See infra notes 230–48 and accompanying text. 
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statements from public officials, and decisions to block individual invest-
ments, we see strong discomfort, occasionally boiling over into outright hos-
tility, towards Asian capital. Is the United States as open as scholars, govern-
ment officials and others purport? 
Two disclaimers are necessary. First, I do not suggest all Asians are 
alike, or somehow constitute a distinct race or ethnicity; I know that Arabs 
differ from Japanese people. Nor do I contend that the U.S. government op-
poses all types of Asian investment all of the time. Rather, the construction 
of U.S. investment law and policy stems from responses to investment from 
various Asian countries in the 1970s, 1980s and 2000s. At the very least, the 
United States’ reaction to investment from Asia gives rise to the perception 
of anti-Asian bias. Congress has expressed this resistance most vociferously, 
fusing populism and nativism to draw attention to certain Asian investments 
and blocking some of them. Less often, federal agencies have done the 
same.10 Such opposition may have sound national security or economic con-
cerns at heart. But because of the Orientalist rhetoric elected and appointed 
officials often use, they create a perception that the United States opposes 
investment from certain jurisdictions.11 Perceptions matter here because 
many foreign investors, by definition, live outside the United States. When 
government officials, elected or appointed, denounce “Arab” or Japanese in-
vestors, the investor himself may believe the reason for the opposition is due 
to his race or national origin, as opposed to the security or economic concern 
the investment may raise. 
Second, I do not discount the possibility of other interpretations. Laws, 
regulations, and agency decisions respond to a variety of concerns, as ex-
plored below. Still, the alternative explanations do not fully account for the 
level or intensity of opposition. To borrow a phrase from employment dis-
crimination, some of these cases may involve “mixed motives,” where both 
legitimate and illegitimate reasons animate a particular decision.12 This Arti-
cle posits that illegitimate reasons might have influenced government actors 
in particular contexts. 
This research is salient for several reasons. First, the United States is 
said to maintain an open policy towards foreign direct investment.13 Former 
Commerce Secretary Gary Locke claimed that the United States was more to 
open to investment than any country in the world.14 Scholars too frequently 
 
 10  I thank my colleague Juscelino Colares for this insight. 
 11  I explain the concept of Orientalism in greater detail below. See infra Part III.B. 
 12  See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93 (2003). 
 13  See also Stephen D. Krasner, U.S. Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unraveling the Paradox of 
External Strength and Internal Weakness, 31 INT’L ORG. 635, 638 (1977). Krasner notes two basic char-
acteristics of the U.S. policy towards international economics: (1) “elimination of barriers to the move-
ments of goods, services, technology, and capital across international boundaries,” and (2) “the control of 
such movements by private, as opposed to state-owned, corporations.” Id. 
 14  Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke Delivers Remarks at U.S.–Russia Business Summit, July 2, 
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make the claim that the United States treats foreign and domestic investors 
alike.15 This research questions that narrative by focusing on key moments in 
the construction of U.S. investment law over the past four decades. I am not 
the first to detect anti-Asian sentiment in response to individual transac-
tions.16 But no Article has charted these incidents, extracted their anti-Asian 
underpinnings, and offered solutions to these problems. We cannot address a 
failure we do not acknowledge. 
Second, this Article contributes to a growing scholarship on racism 
against Asians and Asian-Americans. In the past quarter century, critical le-
gal scholars have examined selected nodes in the United States’ historical 
treatment of Asians. From the “free white person” requirement of the 1790 
Naturalization Act to the global war on terror, the United States has used laws 
and regulations to subordinate, exclude and alienate (literally, “make other”) 
Asians and Asian-Americans.17 Despite shifting geopolitical winds, waves of 
immigration, and the incomplete project of assimilation, “the Asian is always 
seen as an immigrant, as the ‘foreigner-within.’”18 As this Article shows, 
anti-Asian sentiment is no historical artifact. It continues to animate state-
ments and, arguably, decisions by high-ranking government actors: senators, 
representatives, cabinet officials, and agency staff. Collectively, these deter-
minations not only harm Asians and Asian-Americans within our borders by 
perpetuating stereotypes about trustworthiness, citizenship and belonging, 
but also antagonize potential investors by suggesting the United States will 
not accept their capital. 
Third, as the fulcrum of global economic power shifts from West to 
East,19 more investors will seek out economic opportunity in the United 
 
2009 (available through Westlaw). 
 15  See Fred L. Morrison, The Protection of Foreign Investment in the United States of America, 58 
AM. J. COMP. L. 437, 445 (2010) (“[U.S.] law ordinarily treats foreign and domestic investors or businesses 
alike . . . Foreign investors are normally warmly welcomed.”). 
 16  See, e.g., BILL EMMOTT, THE SUN ALSO SETS: THE LIMITS OF JAPAN’S ECONOMIC POWER (1991). 
According to Emmott, former Editor-in-Chief of the Economist news magazine, “racism does exist in 
some attitudes toward Japanese investment in America, Australia and, to a lesser extent, Europe.” Id. at 
146. Emmott cites the Fujitsu-Fairchild transaction as proof of anti-Japanese bias in U.S. investment pol-
icy. For more on Fujitsu-Fairchild, see infra, Part II.A. 
 17  At this point, a vast literature examines the legal treatment of Asians and Asian-Americans. A 
highly incomplete list of important works would include Neil Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the 
“Miss Saigon Syndrome,” in ASIAN-AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT 1087 (Hyung-chan Kim ed., 
1992); Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-
Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1257 (1993); Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and 
Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, “Foreignness,” and Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 
261 (1997); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1576 (2002). 
 18  LISA LOWE, IMMIGRANT ACTS: ON ASIAN AMERICAN CULTURAL POLITICS 5 (1996). 
 19  See CTR. FOR ECON. AND BUS. RESEARCH, Cebr’s World Economic League Table, (Dec. 26, 2013) 
http://www.telegraaf.nl/incoming/article22168758.ece/BINARY/+Cebr_World-Economic-League-
Table-2013.pdf (listing China, India, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Taiwan and Saudi Arabia as among the 
twenty largest economies by 2028).  
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States. As explained more fully below, investors from the Middle East, 
China, and Japan have made significant investments in the United States 
since the 1970s. They may continue to do so, though this cannot be taken for 
granted. Likewise, investors from other emerging economies may also wish 
to invest in the United States. U.S. treatment of Asian investment will receive 
greater scrutiny from Asian investors themselves. Indeed, Chinese media 
puzzle over the “tinted glasses” that U.S. regulators apparently don when 
scrutinizing Chinese investment.20 U.S. media likewise have detected a shift 
in Chinese investment strategies in the wake of high-profile investment de-
cisions by the United States government.21 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the history of foreign 
investment law and policy in the United States. In so doing, it makes the 
claim that the construction of U.S. international investment law is, in large 
part, a series of reactions to Asian investment. This claim finds support in 
congressional testimony by members of the House and Senate, statements of 
appointed officials in various cabinets, acts of political theatre, and other in-
dicia of governmental attitudes towards foreign investment. Having surveyed 
the bedrock of U.S. investment law, Parts II and III dig into the underlying 
sentiments and purposes. Part II asks whether the anti-Asian sentiment serves 
primarily political goals. This part examines national security, economic na-
tionalism and concerns over government control as possible explanations for 
anti-Asian sentiment. Yet, as Part III makes clear, racially discriminatory at-
titudes also animate policy decisions and statements, at least in certain situa-
tions. Invoking critical legal studies, cultural studies, and racial discrimina-
tion lawsuits, Orientalism—a set of outmoded beliefs about Asian culture, 
people, and societies—continues to inform government thinking and deci-
sion-making at the highest levels. Since many decisions are made in confi-
dential settings, the public record—statements by politicians, congressional 
 
 20  See 21-SHIJI JINGJI BAODAO [21ST CENTURY ECONOMIC TIMES], Zhongguo Qiye Ruhe Fangfan 
Meiguo Touzi Anquan Shencha Fengxian [How Can Chinese Companies Guard Against Risks of U.S. 
Investment Security Review], (Sept. 7, 2015), http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20150907/ 
084423172831.shtml. “Although the American is one of the world’s most open markets, its security re-
view process for foreign investment is particularly stringent. For Chinese companies especially, the Amer-
ica’s national security review seems to wear ‘tinted glasses.’ From the early defeat of CNOOC’s bid for 
Unocal and Huawei’s thwarted attempts to invest in the United States, to the recent failure by Sany to 
invest in wind farms, Chinese investors face especially interesting security barriers in U.S. mergers and 
acquisitions.” See also Ben White, Chinese Drop Bid to Buy U.S. Oil Firm, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2005) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/02/AR2005080200404.html (“CNOOC 
Chairman Fu Chengyu and other executives and directors were shocked by the intensity of the negative 
reaction from Congress and by signals that the administration did not want to decide whether to accept or 
reject [CNOOC’s bid for Unocal].”). 
 21  See Isabella Steger, Cnooc’s Unocal Lessons, WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2012) 
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/07/23/cnoocs-unocal-lessons/ (noting that, since CNOOC’ failed bid for 
Unocal, Chinese firms have sought minority stakes in North American energy companies). 
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testimony, and actions often unaccompanied by detailed explanation—is of-
ten the only place to which outside observers can turn for information. Part 
IV aims to redress some of these problems by prescribing courses of action 
for the judicial, executive, and legislative branches. 
 II. A HISTORY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
For most of its history, the United States has advocated free capital 
flows, minimal barriers to foreign investment, and strong protections for U.S. 
investment in other countries.22 With certain exceptions—the Alien Property 
Law (1887), Trading with the Enemy Act (1917)—the United States has 
largely followed Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton’s advice: foreign 
capital “ought to be considered a most valuable auxiliary conducing to put in 
motion a greater quantity of productive labor and a greater portion of useful 
enterprise than could exist without it.”23 
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, most inbound in-
vestment originated in Europe, primarily the United Kingdom (England and 
Scotland).24 The long historical relationship between Europe and the United 
States helped forge U.S. attitudes towards foreign investment. Significant 
emigration from Western Europe, both before and after the founding of the 
United States, helped create the conditions for a liberal investment policy. A 
shared language yoked the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States, 
creating an atmosphere of trust and ease of communication that facilitated 
investment flows. The fact that foreign capital, and the businesses into which 
they were investing, were owned mostly by white Europeans, and their U.S.-
born descendants, likely contributed to the tacit confidence in foreign invest-
ment. As one contemporary British investor put it, “When we’re in America, 
we feel it’s reasonable to behave like Americans. But that’s not so different 
from behaving like an Englishman.”25 This may be one reason why people 
from the United States have paid so little attention to British or European 
 
 22  The most comprehensive treatment of foreign investment in the United States is Mira Wilkinson’s 
two-volume treatise. See MIRA WILKINS, THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
TO 1914 (1989) [hereinafter WILKINS I]; MIRA WILKINS, THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1914-1945 (2004) [hereinafter WILKINS II]. 
 23  ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON MANUFACTURES: COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES (1791). He went on to note that “every farthing of foreign capital . . . laid out in inter-
nal meliorations, and in industrial establishments of a permanent nature, is a precious acquisition.” Id. 
 24  See WILKINS I, supra note 22, at 159. From the late 1890s to the early 1910s, depending on the 
year, British investors supplied approximately 60% to 80% of FDI into the United States; see also 
WILKINS II, supra note 22, at 622 (noting that Britain made the most investment in the United States 
during 1914 to 1945). 
 25  John Burgess, British Investments in U.S. Outpaces Japan’s, Study Finds, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 
1989), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1989/01/27/british-investments-in-us-out-
pace-japans-study-finds/4ff175c6-018f-4102-b877-203954aa672c/. 
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investment. 
Asian investment, however, provoked a very different reaction. The first 
Asian capital flows, which entered the United States in the early 1970s, pro-
voked a strong and largely negative reaction. Members of Congress called 
for restrictions on foreign investment, and set into motion a familiar pattern: 
(1) capital flows from a particular jurisdiction; (2) negative, often racially 
tinged statements about the dangers of investment from that country; (3) calls 
for laws to restrict investment, and occasionally passage of such laws; and 
(4) empowering the executive branch to stanch foreign investment. We ex-
plore this pattern in greater detail below. 
 A. The First Wave of Asian Investment: The 1970s 
In the 1970s, the United States experienced major shifts in inbound in-
vestment. First, foreign direct investment (FDI) accelerated over the course 
of the 1970s, nearly quadrupling between 1970 and 1980, and increased sig-
nificantly after 1973.26 Though still small when compared to outbound U.S. 
investment,27 large amounts of inbound investment sparked concern that the 
United States was losing its economic sovereignty. Foreign investors con-
trolled increasingly large amounts of land, stocks, treasury bills, and other 
assets. This led some to state that foreigners were “invading” the United 
States, taking advantage of U.S. economic stagnation and political turmoil to 
snap up prized properties and struggling blue-chip companies.28 
Second, a small fraction of this capital originated in Asia. At this time, 
the primary investors in the United States were Western.29 But Japan and a 
handful of Middle Eastern countries (Kuwait, Iran and Saudi Arabia) began 
to make sizeable investments, many for the first time. They invested in sec-
tors such as hotels, real estate, mining, banks, airlines, and telecommunica-
 
 26  United States Senate Comm. on Commerce, Impact of Foreign Investments in the United States: 
Hearings Before Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce & Tourism, 93rd Cong. (1973) (statement of Sen. 
Daniel Inouye, Chairman, Subcomm. on Foreign Comm. & Tourism) [hereinafter Tourism Subcomm. 
Hearings]. Sen. Inouye noted “In the first half of 1973, foreign investment was running at an annual rate 
of $1.5 billion, up approximately nine times from the $160 million in 1972.” Id. at 1. Inbound FDI had 
increased steadily in the prior two decades, doubling between 1950 and 1960, and doubling again between 
1960 and 1970. Id. See also EARL H. FRY, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 9 (1981). 
 27  See infra Part IIC.  
 28  See infra notes 150–57 and accompanying text. 
 29  See Bureau of Economic Analysis, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Detail for Po-
sition, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, Aug. 1980 through 1990. A helpful chart summarizing this can 
be found in EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES 43 (2d ed. 1991). Japanese FDI increased steadily from 1980 to 1990. Yet even at its apex, in 
1990, Japanese investment was still second to British investment, surpassing Dutch investment only in 
1988.  
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tions. In so doing, they encountered intense and occasionally insensitive scru-
tiny from the media, congressional hearings, and even popular culture.30 Con-
temporary commentators called it “reverse investment.”31 For the first time 
in U.S. history, investment originated in countries where the United States 
had long enjoyed the dominant position, by virtue of U.S. corporate presence, 
economic support, security guarantees, or some combination thereof.32 
Alongside the influx of Asian capital came the realization that international 
influence was a two-way street. The United States still maintained military, 
diplomatic and political leverage over these countries, but the economic 
power no longer tipped so decisively in its favor. This change had lasting 
reverberations in both the national psyche and foreign policy of the United 
States. 
What were these investments? Who were these investors? In the early 
1970s, the first major wave of Japanese investment reached U.S. shores, 
touching down most prominently in Hawaii’s tourism sector.33 Japanese in-
terests purchased three, of a total of forty-four, golf resorts.34 Other Japanese 
 
 30  Most famously, Howard Beale, the fictional anchorman of the Oscar-winning Network, served up 
an anti-Arab diatribe that continues to resonate in U.S. popular culture. He implored his viewers in the 
following way, “Right now the Arabs have screwed us out of enough American dollars to come right back 
and, with our own money, buy General Motors, IBM, ITT, AT&T, DuPont, US Steel and twenty other 
American companies . . . The Arabs are simply buying us . . . I want you to get up right now and write a 
telegram to President Ford saying ‘I’m mad as hell and I’m not going to take this any more. I don’t want 
the banks selling my country to the Arabs.’” See NETWORK (United Artists 1976).  
 31  Tourism Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 2. The testimony of Hawaiian governor George 
Ariyoshi is quite revealing on this subject. “We know, of course, of the history of colonialism, and how . . . 
the powerful nations of the world exploited the natural resources of underdeveloped lands, primarily for 
the profit of sometimes greedy and very power [sic] entrepreneurs. That age is dying. We are now in the 
age of multinationals and the rising expectations of smaller and poorer nations. The Arab countries with 
their sophisticated management of their own oil resources furnish an example of countries which have 
learned a few lessons from earlier exploiters. And today, too, we have the ‘reverse investments’ in the 
United States by foreign investors who come from lands devastated in World War II, rebuilt by American 
aid in vast quantities, and now often our business competitors. Those ‘reverse investment’ in many cases 
can provide jobs, income, and new vocational opportunities for Americans. They can also cause regional 
conflicts and competitive battles.” Id. at 5. 
 32  For example, the United States helped install the Shah of Iran in 1953, and invested heavily in the 
state until his fall in 1979. See generally Saeed Kamali Dehghan & Richard Norton-Taylor, CIA admits 
role in 1953 Iranian coup, GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/ 
aug/19/cia-admits-role-1953-iranian-coup (describing U.S. government support for the overthrow of dem-
ocratically elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq); Stephen McGlinchey, How the Shah 
Entangled America, NAT’L INTEREST (Aug. 2, 2013), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/how-the-
shah-entangled-america-8821 (describing U.S. military and economic support for the Shah, whom the 
U.S. helped install after ousting Mosaddeq). Likewise, after World War II, the United States occupied 
Japan for six years, rewrote its constitution, and attempted to imprint U.S.-style democracy in various 
Japanese institutions. See WARREN I. COHEN, THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN 
RELATIONS 60 (2013). 
 33  Tourism Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 45–46 (statement of Frank F. Fasi, Mayor of Hon-
olulu). 
 34  Id. at 14 (statement of Edward Greaney, Deputy Director, Department of Planning and Economic 
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investors bought high-end hotels, including three prominent establishments 
on Waikiki Beach.35 In addition to condominiums and real estate parcels of 
various sizes, Japanese investors purchased 11% of Hawaii’s available hotel 
rooms.36 While certain plots were quite large, Japanese investors ended up 
owning less than 1% of Hawaiian land.37 Despite their relatively small size, 
however, these purchases triggered resentment, as explored more fully be-
low.38 
A far more pressing concern was Middle Eastern investment, particu-
larly from Kuwait, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. These transactions stoked signif-
icant public and congressional concern.39 They staked out significant, but not 
controlling, positions in well-known companies.40 Kuwaiti investors, includ-
ing the Kuwaiti government,41 invested in both real estate and corporate 
stock. A Kuwaiti government official explained his country’s strategy in the 
following terms: 
We are studying dozens of proposals for equity investment from 
American companies, many of them well-known names. We are much 
more interested in long-term growth investment in productive enter-
prise than we are in fixed-interest direct obligations. For this we see 
the best opportunities in the big American economy and in West Ger-
many.42 
Real estate investments included Kiawah Island, off the coast of South Car-
olina, where Kuwaitis sought to develop luxury resorts.43 The son of Ku-
wait’s prime minister purchased the Hilton Hotel in downtown Baltimore for 
 
Development, State of Hawaii). 
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. The development office produced a list of Japanese investments for the hearing. See Chrono-
logical Listing of Major Japanese Investments in Hawaii (showing Japanese acquisitions of land, super-
markets, hotels, real estate, golf courses and others). Id. at 19–20. 
 37  Id. at 68. 
 38  See Bruce Benson, Foreign Investors Stir Hawaii, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 1973), at A4 (noting 
Senator Inouye received over 100 letters in 1975 “with complaints relating mostly to Japanese [invest-
ments]. You seldom hear anything about British investments, for example . . . .”). 
 39  Roberta Hornig, Arab Money No Threat, Simon Says, WASH. STAR (Feb. 26, 1975) (transcribing 
an interview with Treasury Secretary William Simon). 
 40  Joseph Lawrence, Should America Welcome Saudi Investment?, INDEPENDENT PRESS-TELEGRAM 
(Oct. 31, 1975), at 31. 
 41  One reason for some U.S. citizens’ discomfort with Arab investment was the difficulty in deline-
ating private from public money. As one contemporaneous article put it, “the government officials making 
the decisions on petrodollar aid and trade are related to, in business with, or even the same person as the 
private investor who puts his money into allied projects.” Jim Hoagland, Private/Public Line Blurs, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 1975), at A1. 
 42  Lawrence, supra note 40. 
 43  See John McDermott, Even on Kiawah, Nothing Lasts Forever, POST & COURIER (June 9, 2013), 
http://www.postandcourier.com/business/even-on-kiawah-nothing-lasts-forever/article_474399f9-4669-
5674-b920-8308df491304.html. The Kuwait Investment Company purchased Kiawah Island in 1974 to 
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$20 million.44 Outside of the United States, Kuwaiti investors bought “bou-
tique” real estate in London, Paris, and Egypt;45 and took a 14% stake in 
Daimler-Benz, the German manufacturer of Mercedes-Benz automobiles.46 
Iran, a nominal U.S. ally until 1979,47 likewise invested in a range of 
industries, including aviation. The country’s main aim in making these in-
vestments was economic development.48 Iran negotiated, but ultimately did 
not consummate, a $300 million stake in the then-troubled (later bankrupt) 
Pan Am Airlines.49 Instead, it purchased jets from TWA.50 The Bank of Iran 
also extended a $75 million loan to the financially troubled defense contrac-
tor Grumman, at least part of which went to a $1.7 billion dollar fighter-jet 
purchase.51 Iranian banks also invested in real estate, including a $500 mil-
lion project with offices, apartments, and a shopping mall in New Orleans.52 
As part of its diversification scheme, Iran also made significant investments 
in Egypt53 and purchased a 25% interest in Krupp, the West German steel 
maker.54 
Saudi Arabia, another nominal U.S. ally, sought a safe place to deposit 
its newfound wealth. Many investors chose bank deposits, corporate stocks, 
and U.S. treasury bills.55 One Saudi official stated that his government sought 
primarily portfolio investment, but would not seek to control more than 5% 
of the shares of any particular U.S. company.56 Indeed, according to one U.S. 
spokesperson for a Saudi bank, Saudi investors did not want “to be involved 
 
develop a world-class resort. The Kuwaitis sold the island in 1988 to KRA, a real estate development 
firm. Id. 
 44  Peter Arnett, Wave of Foreign Investment Washing Across U.S., WASH. POST (July 24, 1979), D7, 
D9. 
 45  Michael Ross, Persian Gulf Oil States: New Power Center Arising? NASHUA TELEGRAPH (Mar. 
10, 1975). 
 46  See id.  
 47  This is not to suggest that the United States and Iran have been close allies. The United States 
helped overthrow democratically elected Prime Minister Mosaddeq, and installed the Shah of Iran, in 
1953. The United States provided military and financial support for the Shah until his 1979 ouster. JAMES 
G. BLIGHT, BECOMING ENEMIES 35–36 (2012). 
 48  See Hornig, supra note 39, at A6. 
 49  Marilyn Berger & Jack Egan, Pan Am, Iran Eye Deal, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 1975), A1, A10. 
 50  Id. at A10. 
 51  See Jack Egan, Petrodollar Glut Raises Foreign Investment Questions, WASH. POST, (Dec. 10, 
1974), D10 (noting that Iran offered the loan when Grumman’s financial situation threatened the produc-
tion of the plane); See Jim Hoagland, Lockheed & the Arab Investors, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 1974), at A18. 
 52  Thomas Brooks, Iran Bank Puts up Development Cash, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 1976), at E10. 
 53  Jim Hoagland, Shah Pushing Closer Ties to Arab Nations, WASH. POST (May 27, 1974), at A21. 
 54  Iran Buys 25.01% Share of Krupp Conglomerate, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 1976), at C11. This deal 
followed Iran’s 1974 purchase of a 25.04% interest in a Krupp subsidiary that produced steel. 
 55  Thomas W. Lippman, Saudis Look West to Invest Year’s $17 Billion Surplus, WASH. POST (Feb. 
14, 1977), at D11; Youssef M. Ibrahim, U.S.-Arab Interests Form Banking Unit, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 
1978), at D1. 
 56  Hobart Rowen, Saudi Sees Little U.S. Investment, WASH. POST (June 8, 1975), at A2. 
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in any takeover operations, and will go only where [they] are wanted.”57 
These investors must have been aware of the resentment and frustration many 
people from the United States directed towards the Saudi government after 
the oil shocks of the 1970s. They likely sought to keep a low profile to avoid 
suspicion.58 
Saudi investors also acquired substantial interest in U.S. banks, includ-
ing the Commonwealth Bank of Detroit.59 In addition to being a safe place to 
invest, banks taught Saudi financiers about the operations of the U.S. finan-
cial system. As Ghaith Pharaon, the primary investor in the Detroit deal, 
noted, the bank provided connections to industrial giants like General Mo-
tors, Dow Chemicals, and Parke-David pharmaceuticals. These companies 
sought to invest in Saudi Arabia.60 
This may seem like a lot of money, but despite the rhetoric, Asian in-
vestment was dwarfed by Western holdings. In 1976, OPEC countries, as the 
U.S. government then classified them, owned less than 1% of foreign direct 
investment in the United States.61 Their share of U.S. portfolio investment 
exceeded this percentage, reaching a peak of 11% of total foreign-owned in-
vestment for one year before settling down into the low single digits.62 With 
such modest holdings, OPEC—even at its brief apex—lacked the financial 
clout to sink the U.S. economy. 
 1. Congress Reacts 
Congress reacted to the first wave of Asian investment in several ways. 
Members of Congress introduced over a dozen bills to scrutinize, restrict, or 
 
 57  Id. The article describes how Kuwaiti, Saudi and Emirati merchant families formed an investment 
bank, Petra, to invest in the U.S. stock market. 
 58  See also Edward Cowan, U.S.-Saudi Talks to Open This Week, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 1975), at 5 
(“Persian Gulf states want to know what industries Washington regards as closed to foreign investment 
or what the investment limits might be.”). 
 59  Foreign Investment Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Comm. on Banking, Housing 
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 58, 81 (1975) (statement of James L. Pate, Ass. Sec’y for Econ. Aff., Dep’t. 
of Comm.) [hereinafter Foreign Investment Act Hearings].  
 60  William K. Stevens, Saudi Sees U.S. Bank as a ‘Catalyst,’ N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 1975), at 43. The 
deal incited significant local opposition, “most noticeably from the Jewish community.” One Detroit law-
yer, who claimed to own 59 shares of preferred stock, said he did not want to see Arabs or any other 
foreigners get “a stranglehold on America.” Id. at 54. 
 61  Information about investment positions in the United States are gleaned from the Commerce De-
partment’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (https://www.bea.gov/scb/date_guide.asp). Ida May Mantel, 
Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 1976, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 26, 35–37 (Oct. 
1977), http://bea.gov/scb/pdf/1977/1077cont.pdf. 
 62  See Russell B. Scholl, The International Investment Position of the United States: Developments 
in 1975, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 29, 32 (Aug. 1976) (listing total foreign-owned assets), 
https://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/1976/0876cont.pdf. See also Christopher L. Bach, OPEC Transaction in the 
U.S. International Accounts, 1972-1977, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 21, 22 (Apr. 1978) (listing as-
sets owned by OPEC countries), http://bea.gov/scb/pdf/1978/0478cont.pdf. 
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require public disclosure of foreign investment.63 In the end, only two bills 
became law, serving primarily to collect information on foreign investment.64 
Anti-Asian sentiment first appeared in Congressional hearings on Japa-
nese investment in Hawaii.65 Bankers, journalists, officials, and businessmen 
described a sharp uptick in Japanese investment in the early 1970s.66 They 
also noted the widespread and generally negative reaction of many Hawai-
ians.67 
A recurring theme at the hearings, conducted by Japanese-American 
Senator Daniel Inouye, was “anti-Japanese racism.”68 The Governor of Ha-
waii testified that citizens of Hawaii expressed “fear and suspicions about the 
motives of foreign investors.”69 He also noted “how unrewarding and dan-
gerous” such attitudes were.70 A Hawaiian newspaper publisher, reflecting 
on recent media coverage, observed “racial undertones to the negative reac-
tions” of the general public towards Japanese investment and Asian invest-
ment more generally.71 The publisher cited examples where Japanese invest-
ments aroused public attention and contrasted that with the lack of “public 
indignation or emotional response” toward investors from Britain or Can-
ada.72 
Some anti-Japanese sentiment may have stemmed from Japan’s 1941 
attack on Pearl Harbor, which prompted the United States to enter World War 
II. Despite a generation of cooperation, and a strong political alliance be-
tween the two countries, some people from the United States may have borne 
a grudge against the citizens of a former enemy. This is not to justify animos-
ity against Japanese investment, but rather to suggest a possible explanation 
for its origins. 
Congress also convened hearings to review Middle Eastern investment 
in the United States. Unlike the Japanese tourism hearings, where partici-
pants reported on anti-Japanese pronouncements, the Senators themselves 
 
 63  Peter Milius, Arabs Investing Cautiously: Feared Intrusions into U.S. Economy Not Developing, 
WASH. POST (June 1, 1975), at 2. 
 64  These include the Foreign Investment Study Act, Pub. L. No. 93-479 (1974), and the International 
Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-472 (1976). Both collect infor-
mation on inbound investment. 
 65  See Tourism Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 26, at 33 (statement of Kideo Kajikawa, President, 
Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce). Indeed, according to one speaker, the term “foreign invest-
ments in Hawaii” means “Japanese investments, even though there are numerous investors from the con-
tinental United States, Great Britain, Canada and other countries in the world.” Id. 
 66  Id. at 68 (statement of Russell A. Taussig. Prof. Finance, Univ. Hawaii) While Japanese investment 
in Hawaii remained constant for the 1970s, it increased 20% in 1971 and 50% in 1972). 
 67  Id. at 67. One report indicated that 66% of Hawaiian residents opposed additional Japanese invest-
ment in Hawaii. 
 68  Id. at 30. This was not the only reason cited for public outcry to Japanese investment. 
 69  Id. at 4 (statement of Hon. George Ariyoshi, Governor of Hawaii). 
 70  Id.  
 71  Id. at 39–40 (statement of George Mason, President, Crossroads Press, Inc.). 
 72  Id. at 40.  
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expressed discriminatory sentiment. Take the following conflation of Arabs 
with Nazis by New York republican, Jacob Javits: 
The Arabs say [there is a war going on]. They say they put a boycott 
on the world. They jacked up the price [on oil] in order to make the 
world do what they want to do in the war against the Israelis. That is 
what they say. You know, we learned from Hitler, you have to take 
them at their word.73 
Senator Javits’s testimony is extraordinary in many ways. The use of the in-
determinate word “Arabs” condemns an entire ethnicity for the actions of a 
tiny elite. The comparison to Hitler likewise defies logic. Yet it forms part of 
the oppositional discourse politicians use to raise suspicions about foreign 
investment. 
Javits also feared that “Arabs” would take over U.S. blue-chip compa-
nies. When that happens, “control will be exercised by people who as a group 
are technologically backward [and] subject to the direction of governments 
which have no mastery of the complexities of the multinational corporation 
and its operations or of the public interest involved.”74 Javits incited fear of 
Asian capital by suggesting that Arabs, who lacked the intelligence to man-
age multinational corporations, would try to “take over” U.S. companies. 
Javits was hardly alone in his fear of Arabs. 
Senator Howard Metzenbaum, Democrat of Ohio, also voiced concern 
about “Arab” control of U.S. companies. He believed that OPEC nations 
would use their newfound wealth “to acquire uncontested control of 51 per-
cent of the voting stock in eleven of our largest companies [including] A.T. 
& T., Boeing, Dow Chemical, General Dynamics, General Motors, IBM, 
ITT, Lockheed, United Airlines, U.S. Steel and Xerox.”75 He further sur-
mised that “by 1979, the OPEC nations would have enough surplus dol-
lars . . . to buy 100 percent of all of the stock of all of the companies listed 
on the [New York Stock Exchange].”76 
Metzenbaum decried the “nouveau riche OPEC nations” for their “reck-
less disregard for public responsibility. They are determined that with their 
wealth they will go where they want, and do what they please. As is so typical 
of the nouveau riche, they expect to use their wealth to exercise economic, 
political and social pressure.”77 Despite Metzenbuam’s characterizations, 
Middle Eastern investors primarily sought to diversify their portfolios, de-
velop domestic industries, gain exposure to capital markets, and learn about 
 
 73  Foreign Investment Act Hearings, supra note 59, at 41 (statement of Sen. Jacob Javits, Member, 
Senate Banking Committee). 
 74  Id. at 44. 
 75  Id. at 58 (statement of Ret. Sen. Howard Metzenbaum). 
 76  Id. 
 77  Id. at 59. 
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corporate governance. Many of the blue-chip companies in which they in-
vested—Pan Am, AT&T, Krupp—deployed advanced technologies. If any-
thing, Middle Eastern investors were using capital to modernize their econo-
mies, and reduce their reliance on oil revenues. 
To be sure, geopolitics incited some of the anti-Arab sentiment. The Oil 
Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC)—of which Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
and Kuwait were all members—quadrupled the price of gasoline in 1973. 
The “oil shocks,” which contributed to America’s longest economic reces-
sion since the Great Depression,78 as well as high unemployment rates and a 
long period of inflation surely contributed to resentment against Middle East-
ern investment.79 In this harsh economic climate, Middle Eastern investors 
proved easy scapegoats, despite the fact that their economic presence bene-
fited capital-starved U.S. businesses. 
Arab investors seized on congressional attitudes.80 One Saudi official 
noted that Congress’s reaction made some Saudis believe their investments 
were not secure in the United States.81 He overstated his claim that, “We are 
not going to invest in the Western world at all.”82 But his concern was valid. 
Congressional testimony sends strong signals to outside observers, particu-
larly those unfamiliar with the rough and tumble of congressional politics. A 
critical remark about foreign investors may score easy points for a U.S. pol-
itician, but it could also appear as front-page news in the foreign country so 
criticized.83 
 2. The Birth of CFIUS 
By 1975, the use of the term “foreign investment” signaled anxiety over 
Asian investment. Congressional hearings revealed tensions about Japanese 
investment in Hawaii and Middle Eastern portfolio investment. Members of 
Congress responded with a spate of bills to restrict foreign investment.84 
 
 78  See NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, U.S. Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, 
http://www.nber.org/cycles.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2016) (listing various recessions from the 1850s to 
the present).  
 79  See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Labor Force Statistics from the Cur-
rent Population Survey, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNU04000000?years_option=all_years& 
periods_option=specific_ periods&periods=Annual+Data (last visited Nov. 26, 2016). 
 80  Hobart Rowen, Investing Plan Cut by Arabs, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 1975), at F2. The article de-
scribes a Treasury official’s visit to the Middle East, where he found officials in Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and 
Qatar disturbed over U.S. fears that Arab investors sought to take control of U.S. companies. The officials 
stressed that they are mainly interested in minority positions of a portfolio nature and in real estate. 
 81  Hobart Rowen, Saudi Sees Little U.S. Investment, WASH. POST (June 8, 1975), at A2. Saudi offi-
cials told a Treasury official that the Saudi government is interested in portfolio investments “not to ex-
ceed 5 per cent of any one company.” 
 82  Id. 
 83  Ikuo Kabashima & Hideo Sato, Local Content and Congressional Politics: Interest-group Theory 
and Foreign-policy Implications, 30 INT’L STUDIES QUARTERLY, 295, 297 (1986). 
 84  John C. Culver, Foreign Investment in the United States, 16 FOREIGN POLICY 159 (1974). 
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The Ford Administration sought to allay congressional concerns and 
maintain America’s traditionally open investment environment85 by estab-
lishing the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 
(CFIUS).86 Through CFIUS, the Ford Administration maintained executive 
branch control over investment policy; it would retain the United States’ tra-
ditional openness to foreign investment and reinforce political alliances 
across Asia. By bringing together eight federal agencies,87 CFIUS ensured 
that foreign investment still flowed into the United States and broadly served 
the national interest. 
CFIUS is commonly regarded as the genesis of U.S. investment law. 
Together with the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendments and the 2007 Foreign In-
vestment and National Security Act, CFIUS forms a key plank of the regula-
tory apparatus.88 At its inception, then, U.S. investment law responded to fear 
of Asian investment. In continuing this historical overview, this foundational 
concern resurfaces regularly. 
 B. The Second Asian Wave: The 1980s 
The second major wave of Asian investment reached U.S. shores in the 
1980s. While the first wave of Japanese investment into Hawaii faced local 
resistance, its second wave incurred a hostile reception of national propor-
tions in the 1980s. Why? Japan’s economic success in the 1960s and 1970s 
made it the United States’ main economic rival by the 1980s.89 Across a wide 
range of products—television sets, stereos, cars, motorcycles, computers, 
semiconductors—Japanese companies manufactured goods often superior in 
quality and generally comparable (or lower) in price than their U.S. counter-
parts. 
At the same time, Japan maintained relatively high barriers to trade and 
 
 85  Jack Egan, U.S. to Propose Informal Foreign Investment Curbs, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 1975), at 
F1 (noting the Ford Administration’s fear that the broad-brush approach of the proposed Foreign Invest-
ment Act could trigger retaliation against U.S. investments abroad, or reduce foreign investment in the 
US). 
 86  Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (May 7, 1975). While membership has changed over 
the years, the current composition includes the heads of the following departments and offices: Treasury, 
Justice, Homeland Security, Commerce, Defense, Energy, State, Science and Technology Policy. See U.S. 
DEP’T OF TREASURY, Composition of CFIUS, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/for-
eign-investment/Pages/cfius-members.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2016). 
 87  Executive Order 11858 lists the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, and Commerce; the U.S. 
Trade Representative; the Chairman of the Council of Economic, the Attorney General, and the Director 
of Office and Management and Budget. Id. at 1(a). 
 88  This Article does not discuss the 1992 Byrd Amendment, which expanded CFIUS’ investigatory 
remit to include government-controlled investments. See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL34082, EXON-FLORIO FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROVISION, COMPARISON OF H.R. 556 & S. 1610 13 
(2007). 
 89  Japan was the world’s third largest economy in 1970, behind the United States and Soviet Union. 
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investment. This hurt U.S. exporters looking to break into the Japanese mar-
ket, and it also created barriers for U.S. investors.90 The result was an increas-
ingly large trade deficit between Japan and the United States—one that per-
sists to this day.91 This imbalance heightened tensions between the two 
countries and led to a series of negotiations, accommodations, and agree-
ments to defuse tensions. 
Japanese investment increased over the course of the 1980s. By 1990, 
Japan was the largest investor in the United States.92 Japanese investors were 
active in banking, manufacturing (cars, electronics, machinery), and real es-
tate.93 The Japanese government also accumulated large quantities of U.S. 
government debt. From the point of view of the trade deficit, Japanese direct 
investment should have been welcome. When Honda builds a factory in Ohio 
(or Nissan in Tennessee, Toyota in Kentucky, or Mitsubishi in Illinois), it 
manufactures cars in the United States. These products contribute to U.S. 
manufacturing, reduce U.S. purchases of Japanese goods, and theoretically 
reduce the trade deficit.94 
Yet many in Congress criticized Japanese investment.95 They high-
lighted the negative effects of Japanese economic relations with the United 
States, introduced bills to restrict foreign investment, and engaged in political 
 
 90  See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Trade Friction with Japan and the American Response, 82 MICH. L. 
REV. 1647, 1656 (1984) (noting Japanese efforts to lower barriers to trade and investment in the 1970s 
and 1980s); Peter Reynolds, Foreign Investment in Japan: The Legal and Social Climate, 18 TEX. INT’L 
L. J. 175, 186–89 (1983) (describing three increasingly less restrictive phases of Japanese investment pol-
icy from World War II to 1983). 
 91  In 2013, the U.S. logged a $73.4 billion trade deficit with Japan, though it is rarely mentioned in 
major media. One reason might be the U.S.’s $318.7 billion trade deficit with China, which tends to cap-
ture more headlines. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Trade in Goods with China, https://www.census.gov/for-
eign-trade/balance/c5700.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2016). 
 92  GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 29, at 22. 
 93  See id. at 24–28; Cristina Lee, Japan’s US Investments Top $10 Billion, J. COMM., Aug. 12, 1987 
(discussing Japanese investment in electrical machinery, general machinery and transportation equip-
ment). 
 94  Of course, international investment also helps transfer advanced technologies to the United States, 
and employs U.S. workers.  
 95  Many Members of Congress expressed anti-Japanese sentiment in congressional hearings. This 
article, however, focuses only on those statements relating to Japanese trade and investment. For addi-
tional statements, see Associated Press, Some Japanese-Americans hear bigotry in harsh trade talks, 
NASHUA TELEGRAPH, Apr. 11, 1985. The article recounts several anti-Japanese statements made by U.S. 
Members of Congress, in congressional hearings. Senator John Danforth complained the Japanese “are 
sucking the world dry.” Senator Ernest Hollings noted the Japanese “love all those bowings – they have 
been doing that for 25 years and getting away with it.” Senator John Heinz noted when the “Japanese get 
their little fork into U.S. – or chopsticks . . . they really to stick it to us.” Representative Richard Schulze 
submitted into testimony a letter, describing a Japanese negotiating technique, that read “The Japs even 
have a word for it called ‘harage’ which basically means saying one thing when you really mean the 
opposite.” The congressman is referring to haragei (literally, “stomach art”), a form of indirection where 
one expresses his intention through non-verbal means, rather than direct language. 
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theatre. They linked Japanese investment to twentieth century colonial ex-
pansion, surmising that Japan once again aspired to “worldwide dominance” 
in the semiconductor industry.96 Representative Helen Bentley pursued the 
analogy even further, referencing the “corporate war machines of both Ger-
many and Japan.”97 She cited Japan’s colonial project in the early twentieth 
century as proof of its imperial ambitions in the 1980s.98 
U.S.–Japan economic tensions came to a head when Toshiba, a Japanese 
computer company, sold advanced tools to Russia, violating an international 
agreement to ban high-tech exports to the Soviet bloc.99 Members of Con-
gress immediately denounced Japan. They congregated on Capitol Hill be-
fore a group of reporters, smashed a Toshiba radio, and called for a consumer 
boycott of Toshiba products.100 
The recital revealed much about congressional anxiety over Japan. First, 
by holding the performance on Capitol Hill, Members of Congress made their 
statement on highly symbolic ground. Second, the violence itself was strik-
ing. To the extent the general public saw members of Congress, at least in 
the mid-1980s, it was typically in scripted speeches on the House floor. Pub-
licly smashing a radio departs from the decorous behavior normally associ-
ated with elected representatives. Third, and most germane to this Article’s 
thesis, the violence only targeted a Japanese entity. Kongsberg, a Norwegian 
state-owned defense contractor, also sold sensitive software to the Soviet Un-
ion in the same transaction.101 Yet no one in Congress burned a Kongsberg 
effigy, or publicly directed animosity towards the European company. Later, 
the Senate banned both Toshiba and Kongsberg from exporting equipment 
 
 96  Semiconductors and the Electronics Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Science, Tech., 
and Space, 101st Cong. 70 (1990) (statement of Peter H. Mills, Senior Vice President, Administration, 
Sematech). 
 97  136 Cong. Rec. H2036-04 (1990) (statement of Rep. Bentley). 
 98  Id. at H2038. Representative Bentley’s proof of recent Japanese imperialism was the construction 
of Japanese schools in the United States, and retirement homes in Australia.  
 99  John Burgess, Japan Worries that Scandal Has Hurt Relations with U.S., WASH. POST, (July 16, 
1987), at E1. The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom) was established to 
restrict transfer of strategic technology to the Soviet Union and other communist nations. The enforcement 
mechanism depended upon the voluntary cooperation of the various members. See generally Wende A. 
Wrubel, The Toshiba-Kongsberg Incident: Shortcoming of Cocom, and Recommendations for Increased 
Effectiveness of Export Controls to the East Bloc, 4 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 241, 244, 265 (1989). 
 100 Dave Skidmore, State Department Says Punitive Efforts May Backfire, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 
1, 1987). 
 101 David E. Sanger, Retaliation Demanded in High-Tech Diversion, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 1987), at 
D1. 
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to the United States for a number of years.102 Nonetheless, the political thea-
ter and negative characterizations targeted only Toshiba, not Kongsberg.103 
 1. CFIUS Responds to Japan: Fujitsu & Fairchild 
Toshiba was not the only Japanese company to make headlines in the 
United States. Shortly before the radio-smashing incident, a proposed Japa-
nese investment thrust CFIUS into national headlines.104 The Japanese com-
puter company Fujitsu sought to buy Fairchild, a pioneering high-tech com-
pany once known as “the progenitor of Silicon Valley.”105 In 1979, French 
multinational Schlumberger purchased Fairchild for $425 million.106 
Schlumberger tried to revive the company’s fortune107 but seven years later 
decided to sell its stake to Fujitsu for $200 million.108 However, CFIUS’s 
investigation into the transaction,109 as well as strong opposition from cabinet 
officials,110 pushed Fujitsu to withdraw its bid.111 
When U.S. Deputy Trade Representative Mike Smith (then in Brazil) 
heard that Fujitsu dropped its bid, his reaction was telling. According to the 
Los Angeles Times, Smith “jumped from his chair, thrust both fists high over 
his head in a traditional Japanese salute and trumpeted: ‘Banzai! Banzai!’”112 
Smith’s conduct evoked Japanese fighter pilots from World War II, who 
 
 102 . . . But Not That, WASH. POST (July 3, 1987) at A26 (“Reverting to the politics of the sledgeham-
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Toshiba affair.”). 
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tor, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 1986), at 4. Fairchild was bleeding tens of millions of dollars a year by the 
mid-1980s. 
 108 Pollack, supra note 105. 
 109 Lachica, supra note 107. 
 110 Auerbach, supra note 104. 
 111 National Semiconductor, a U.S. high-technology firm, ultimately bought Fairchild for $122 mil-
lion in 1987. Christine Winter, National Semiconductor to Buy Fairchild, CHICAGO TRIB. (Sept. 1, 1987), 
§ 3, at 3. 
 112 Donna K. Walters & William C. Rempel, Trade War Victim: One-Time Winner is Out of Chips, 
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 1, 1987), at 5. 
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shouted “Banzai” before smashing their planes into enemy warships.113 Four 
decades after the end of World War II, Smith’s triumphalism displays dis-
comfort, if not outright hostility, towards Japan. Since the U.S.T.R. partici-
pates in the CFIUS process, it is possible to impute Smith’s anti-Japanese 
sentiment to CFIUS itself. 
Another cabinet official viewed Fujitsu’s bid “as part of a master plan 
of the Japanese to take over the U.S. information industry.”114 A degree of 
caution seems warranted before imputing such positions to U.S. official pol-
icy. These positions are, however, indicative of strong anti-Japanese senti-
ment in the executive branch. 
 2. Congress Responds: Exon-Florio Amendments 
This outpouring of anti-Japanese sentiment did not merely express neg-
ative stereotypes about Asians. It also had legislative consequences. The 
Exon-Florio Amendment is the most significant development in U.S. inter-
national investment law since the establishment of CFIUS. In 1988, Congress 
passed the Exon-Florio amendments to the Defense Production Act of 1950. 
The newly revised law empowered the President to block foreign investments 
that, in his estimation, threatened national security.115 
According to its sponsors, Senator James Exon and Representative 
James Florio, the law was a direct response to Fujitsu’s attempted acquisition 
of Fairchild and was designed to bolster U.S. national security.116 However, 
as we will explore below, the “national security” ramifications of foreign in-
vestment are often exaggerated, as they were here. Instead, anti-Asian senti-
ment animated opposition to foreign investment and generated support for 
the Exon-Florio amendments in particular.117 
 
 113 Literally “10,000 years,” roughly equivalent to “Long live X” (in English) or “Viva X” (in Span-
ish). 
 114 William C. Rempel & Donna K.H. Walters, The Fairchild Deal: Trade War: When Chips Were 
Down, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 30, 1987), at 2.  
 115 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2013). 
 116 See Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States International Investment Obliga-
tions in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 56 (1989). Senator Exon invoked both 
the Fujitsu takeover and the failed takeover attempt of the Goodyear tire company by British investor, 
James Goldsmith, in his remarks. See 100 CONG. REC. S8881 (1988) (statement of Sen. Exon). Repre-
sentative Florio complained to his colleagues on the House floor that, during the Fujitsu “takeover,” the 
“President found that he had very little authority to act. This provision will give the President important 
powers to protect our national security.” See 100 CONG. REC. H8143 (1988) (statement of Rep. Florio). 
 117 Alvarez describes the animosity towards the Fujitsu acquisition in largely political terms. For ex-
ample, he notes that industry observers compared the Fujitsu takeover to “selling Mount Vernon to the 
redcoats.” See Alvarez, supra note 116, at 57. However, as we have seen, congressional opposition to the 
deal frequently involved racist caricature and thinly veiled attacks on Japanese characteristics. 
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 C. The Third Asian Wave: The 2000s 
By the turn of the millennium, after nearly a decade of economic stag-
nation, Japan was no longer viewed as a threat to U.S. prosperity. Two groups 
from Asia took its place. After decades of economic growth, China represents 
a potential threat to U.S. national interests. Additionally, “Arab” investment 
has once again emerged as a source of tension. 
 1. Chinese Investment 
Chinese investment has attracted an enormous amount of attention in 
the past decade. Yet China, like the Middle East and Japan in the 1970s, re-
mains a relatively minor source of U.S. foreign direct investment. Chinese 
investment amounted to $2.42 billion in 2013, making it the fourteenth larg-
est investor in the United States—after South Korea, Norway, and Mexico.118 
That same year, China provided approximately 1% of the $236 billion dollars 
of inbound investment.119 
Despite its relatively small size, Chinese investment in certain sectors 
has attracted a significant amount of attention. In 2005, the state-owned 
China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) bid on Unocal, the U.S. oil 
company. Congress’s reaction was swift and severe. Members of Congress 
portrayed CNOOC’s potential acquisition as a threat to national security,120 
a challenge to market-based economics,121 and evidence of China’s “national 
strategy of domination of energy markets and the Western Pacific.”122 Rep-
resentative Duncan Hunter suggested the transaction would reduce U.S. lev-
erage in the global war on terror because China would gain control of Un-
ocal’s pipelines in Asia.123 In addition, Unocal—in conjunction with other 
major oil companies—had worked closely with Central Asian governments 
 
 118 Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: 2014 Report, ORG. FOR INT’L INVESTMENT 5 
(2014), http://www.ofii.org/sites/default/files/FDIUS2014.pdf. Norway’s economy is about one-twentieth 
the size of China’s. 
 119 Id. at 3. 
 120 This was the topic of a three-hour congressional hearing before the House Armed Services Com-
mittee. 
 121 Forty-one members of Congress asked President Bush to stiff review the deal, citing increased 
competition for U.S.-based companies in the global oil market, technology transfer implications, and Chi-
nese subsidies to its domestic gas industry. Dennis K. Berman, Cnooc’s Unocal Bid Draws U.S. Legisla-
tors’ Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2005). Moreover, since CNOOC offered a higher price than Chevron 
($67 per share, against Chevron’s $60), many skeptical commentators believed the deal amounted to a 
rejection of market capitalism. Of course, it could have been that Unocal was worth more to CNOOC than 
it was to Chevron. China’s appetite for natural resources in the 2000s was vast. 
 122 National Security Implications of the Possible Merger of the China National Off-shore Oil Corpo-
ration (CNOOC) with Unocal Corporation: Hearing Before the Comm. On Armed Serv. H.R., 109th 
Cong. 110–12 (2005) (statement of James Woolsey, former Director of C.I.A.). 
 123 Id. (statement of Rep. Duncan Hatcher, Chair, H. Armed Services Comm.) [hereinafter Hatcher 
Statement].  
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to develop a pipeline linking Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.124 
Unocal withdrew from the consortium in 1998, but it had already spent years 
negotiating with the Taliban by that time.125 It also had set up pipelines in 
Burma.126 Both experiences, as well as potential U.S. government involve-
ment in setting up these projects, would have raised national security con-
cerns. Given the various risks associated with working in these areas, Unocal 
may very well have partnered with U.S. government officials on such deals. 
Some expressed concern about government ownership of a domestic oil 
company.127 CNOOC Limited is 70% owned by the Chinese government, 
while the remaining 30% of its shares are publicly traded on the New York 
and Hong Kong stock exchanges.128 Others feared the Chinese government 
would “lock up” Unocal’s oil supplies, keeping them out of U.S. hands.129 
Outside Washington, DC, some expressed doubt about these concerns. 
In an article entitled “Bogus fears send the Chinese packing,” the Economist 
theorized that Unocal’s oil reserves were not large enough to jeopardize 
world oil markets or disrupt U.S. access.130 Others characterized Congress’s 
national security concerns as “disingenuous.”131 
The CNOOC transaction was the first in a string of Chinese acquisitions 
opposed by the federal government. Between 2008 and 2011, CFIUS blocked 
three investments from the Chinese telecommunications company, 
Huawei.132 In 2012, the House Intelligence Committee issued a report high-
lighting national security concerns about Huawei.133 Interestingly, the Com-
mittee’s report adduced no evidence of a national security threat, at least in 
 
 124 Paul Hueper, Energy investment a priority, PETROLEUM ECONOMIST (Dec. 2, 2002). 
 125 See Taleban in Texas for talk on gas pipeline, BBC (Dec. 4, 1997), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/world/west_asia/37021.stm. 
 126 See Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003) (alleging human rights violations in connection 
with Unocal’s construction of a pipeline in Burma). 
 127 Hatcher Statement, supra note 123. 
 128 DICK K. NANTO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33093, CHINA AND THE CNOOC BID FOR 
UNOCAL: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 7 (2006). 
 129 Brad Foss, Experts say national security threats not clear in CNOOC bid for Unocal, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (June 28, 2005) (quoting Richard D’Amato, chairman of U.S.–China Economic and Security Re-
view Commission). 
 130 See Bogus fears send the Chinese packing, ECONOMIST (Aug. 2, 2005) http://www.econo-
mist.com/node/4244565. 
 131 William Pesek, Jr. No fury like a bidder scorned?, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Feb. 27, 2006). Pesek 
describes racism in the European reaction to a proposed acquisition of French Arcelor by Mittal Steel—a 
company based in Rotterdam and founded by Indian-born Lakshi Mittal. 
 132 See Scott M. Flicker & Dana M. Parsons, Huawei – CFIUS Redux: Now It Gets Interesting, PAUL 
HASTINGS (Mar. 2011), https://www.paulhastings.com/docs/default-source/PDFs/1868.pdf (noting 
CFIUS scuttled Huawei investments in 3Com in 2008, 2Wire and Motorola in 2010, and 3Leaf in 2011). 
 133 See H.R., PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, Investigative Report on the U.S. Na-
tional Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei & ZTE (Oct. 8, 2012), 
https://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/huawei-zte%20investigative 
%20report%20(final).pdf (“Intelligence Report”). It is fairly unusual for a House committee to issue a 
report that singles out a company (or two) in this way. 
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the unclassified version made available to the public. In lieu of evidence, the 
report cited Huawei’s evasiveness to questions posed by members of Con-
gress.134 The report also conflated Huawei with China, as if all Chinese enti-
ties, even privately held ones, acted on behalf of the state.135 In sum, it re-
peated many of the mistakes of earlier interactions between the U.S. 
government and Asian investors. 
 2. Arab Investment: Dubai Ports World 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, once again provoked anti-
Arab sentiment in broad swathes of the United States. The twenty-one 9/11 
hijackers hailed from Arab states, including allies such as Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.136 But that does not mean every Arab 
person or investor represents a threat to U.S. national security. Still, many 
people from the U.S. engage in racial profiling of anyone who appears “Mid-
dle Eastern, Arab or Muslim.”137 
The animosity was displayed most prominently when Dubai Ports 
World’s (“DPW”), owned by the Dubai sovereign wealth fund, proposed an 
acquisition of the English port operator, Peninsular and Oriental Steam Nav-
igation Company (“P&O”). At the time, DPW was one of the world’s largest 
port operators, running sixty terminals on six continents.138 Had the invest-
ment gone through, DPW would have acquired one of the world’s oldest port 
operators, as well as the ability to operate a very small number of terminals 
in the United States.139 
 
 134 The first recommendation, for example, state that the “United States should view with suspicion 
the continued penetration of the U.S. telecommunications market by Chinese telecommunications com-
panies.” The sweeping nature of this statement, the failure to distinguish which Chinese companies pose 
a threat, and the lack of evidence of Huawei’s wrongdoing pose major challenges to the report’s credibil-
ity. Id. at vi. 
 135 Huawei is a private company owned by its employees. Its founder, Ren Zhengfei, worked as an 
engineer with the People’s Liberation Army in the 1980s. To be sure, its ownership structure is far from 
transparent. But one cannot thus conclude that it operates exclusively at the behest of the Chinese govern-
ment, or Chinese Communist Party. See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Owner-
ship: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665 (2015). 
 136 Fifteen came from Saudi Arabia, two from the United Arab Emirates, one from Egypt and one 
from Lebanon. See CNN LIBRARY, September 11th Hijackers Fast Facts, CNN (last updated Sept. 5, 
2016), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11th-hijackers-fast-facts/. 
 137 Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1576 (2002) (describing five 
types of racial profiling that led to the detention of over twelve hundred non-citizens). Id. at 1576. 
 138 See DP WORLD VANCOUVER, Who We Are, https://www.dpworld.ca/about-us/ (last visited Nov. 
26, 2016). 
 139 Jonathan Weisman & Bradley Graham, Dubai Firm to Sell U.S. Port Operations, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 10, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/09/AR 
2006030901124.html. 
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DPW submitted the transaction for CFIUS review in late 2005,140 en-
listing the support of political operatives from both parties: former President 
Bill Clinton, former Secretary of State Madeline Albright, and former Senate 
majority leader Bob Dole.141 CFIUS approved the investment on January 17, 
2006, provoking a congressional maelstrom that would ultimately scupper 
the deal 
Both on and off the floor, members of Congress used charged language 
to derail the deal. Representative Barney Frank rebuked the Bush Admin-
istration for its “lapse in judgment” by approving the investment in the first 
place.142 He stated: 
Someone should have said to the people from Dubai that they are very 
nice people with whom we have no particular quarrel, but they should 
not take it personally if we explain to them that in the current context 
in the world, having people from their part of the world controlling 
shipping was likely to cause more trouble than it was worth . . . 143 
Representative Frank used more genteel language than Senators Javits and 
Metzenbaum did in the 1970s. But the assumption remains unchanged: Arabs 
cannot be trusted. The trouble with Frank’s statement is that it engages, albeit 
politely and discreetly, in racial profiling. It disqualifies an investor not on 
its own merits—whether it can produce the good or deliver the service—but 
due to its ethnicity. 
Representative Duncan Hatcher also denounced the transaction, calling 
Dubai “a bazaar for terrorist nations to receive prohibited components from 
sources from the free world and the nonfree world.”144 Senator Frank Lauten-
berg invoked religious allegory, intoning, “[d]on’t let them tell you that it’s 
just a transfer of title. Baloney. We wouldn’t transfer the title to the Devil; 
we’re not going to transfer it to Dubai.”145 Such language uses new forms of 
anti-Arab rhetoric (i.e. terrorism, religion) to dress up old antagonisms.146 
 
 140 Id. 
 141 Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Bill Clinton helped Dubai on ports deal, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2006), 
https://www.ft.com/content/60414c4c-a95e-11da-a64b-0000779e2340; Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Role of Sen. 
Dole’s Husband at Issue, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con-
tent/article/2006/02/23/AR2006022301882.html; John Cranford, Defining ‘Ours’ in a New World, CQ 
WEEKLY (Mar. 3, 2006). 
 142 One Year After Dubai Ports World, Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin. Serv., Comm. on Foreign 
Inv. in the U.S. (CFIUS), 110th Cong. 12 (2007) (statement of Rep. Barney Frank, Chair, H. Comm. on 
Fin. Serv.). 
 143 Id. 
 144 National Security Implications of the Dubai Ports World Deal to Take Over Management of U.S. 
Ports: Hearing before the H. Armed Serv. Comm., 109th Cong. 3 (2006). 
 145 Id.  
 146 Many scholars agree that Islamophobia constitutes a “new racism,” to be placed alongside previous 
biological, cultural, and social constructions of race. See generally Nasar Meer and Tehseen Noorani, A 
Sociological Comparison of Anti-Semitism and Anti-Muslim Sentiment in Britain, 56 SOC. REV. 195, 198 
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In the end, Congress passed a bill prohibiting the acquisition of “any 
leases, contracts, rights or other obligations of P&O Ports by Dubai Ports 
World,” or “any other legal entity affiliated with or controlled by DPW.”147 
DPW withdrew its bid the following day. Representative Jerry Lewis fired a 
celebratory salvo, calling the annulment “a rifle shot crack to block the Dubai 
Ports World deal only. This is a national issue. This is a national security bill. 
We want to make sure that the security of our ports is in America’s 
hands . . . .”148 
Just two months earlier, CFIUS, under President George W. Bush, ap-
proved the transaction. While the Department of Homeland Security raised 
objections about the sale to DPW,149 U.S. intelligence agencies found no “de-
rogatory information” about DPW. DPW also agreed to cooperate with law 
enforcement officials in the future, whereupon Homeland Security gave its 
approval.150 It is unlikely that Homeland Security lacked salient information 
about a major national security threat. But it is even more unlikely that a 
member of Congress possessed information about a national security threat 
that Homeland Security did not. 
 3. Congress Reacts: Foreign Investment & National Security Act of 
2007 
Congress responded to the Unocal and Dubai Ports World incidents by 
passing the 2007 Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA). As 
it did with Exon-Florio, Congress empowered the executive to scrutinize and 
restrict foreign investments, this time by expansively defining national secu-
rity.151 The concept now included critical technologies, critical infrastructure 
(including energy assets), the “capacity of domestic industries to meet na-
tional defense requirements, including the availability of human resources, 
products, technologies, materials, supplies and services,” as well as other fea-
tures.152 
Members of Congress, just as they did with the Exon-Florio amend-
ments, attributed the passage of FINSA to Asian investment. Senator Chris 
Dodd observed the following during congressional hearings: 
Concern within Congress about a transaction that would transfer con-
trol of terminal operations to a company owned by a Persian Gulf 
 
(2008). 
 147 JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RL33388, THE COMM. ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
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 148 House Panel Votes to Block Ports Deal, FOX NEWS (Mar. 9, 2006). 
 149DHS Protested Port Takeover, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 26, 2006), http://www.mili-
tary.com/NewsContent/0,13319,89396,00.html. 
 150 Id.  
 151 Defense Production Act of 1950, § 2170(b)(1)(D), (as amended 2007). 
 152 Defense Production Act of 1950, § 2170(f)(2), (as amended 2007). 
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emirate through whose financial system funds had been transferred to 
the terrorists who carried out the September 11, 2001 attacks upon the 
United States, and that had been a central conduit for nuclear weapons 
components being smuggled to hostile regimes, provided further im-
petus for review of the manner in which foreign transactions were be-
ing analyzed by CFIUS.153 
Once again, Congress linked Dubai with terrorism. The concern was not 
simply, as Representative Hunter suggested, that Dubai was a porous weap-
ons entrepôt that armed hostile regimes. Senator Dodd suggested that banks 
based in Dubai helped finance the 9/11 attacks. The implication being that 
such transactions made the country a dangerous port operator. Banks in Brit-
ain, Canada, Germany, and the United States also helped finance the terrorist 
attacks,154 but that did not disqualify port operators from these jurisdictions 
from operating ports in the United States. 
The differential treatment reserved for Arab investment did not go un-
noticed. President George W. Bush asked, “Why all of a sudden a Middle 
Eastern company is held to a different standard than a British one?”155 Like-
wise, General John Abizaid, commander of U.S. Central Command, said he 
was “very dismayed by the emotional responses some people have put on the 
table here in the United States that really comes down to Arab and Muslim-
bashing.”156 Still, the political response, and to some extent the public re-
sponse, disfavored Arab and Asian investment.157 Even after four decades of 
investment, United States officials still found reasons to reject or suspect cap-
ital flows from Asia. It is important to note that, at least as far as my research 
shows, no official has publicly adduced a foreign investment that harmed 
U.S. national security. 
 
 153 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, 153 CONG. REC. S8753 (daily ed. June 29, 
2007) (statement of Sen. Dodd), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2007-06-29/html/CREC-2007-06-
29-pt1-PgS8753.htm. 
 154 This list would include, at the very least, Standard Chartered, Western Union, Dresdner Bank 
(Hamburg), First Union Bank (New Jersey), SunTrust Bank (Fort Lauderdale), Citibank, Bank of America 
(San Diego), Union Bank of California, Royal Bank of Canada, National Commercial Bank (Saudi Ara-
bia), Saudi British Bank (Saudi Arabia), UAE Exchange Centre (Dubai), Hudson United Bank (New Jer-
sey), Dime Savings (New Jersey). See National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States, The Financing of the 9/11 Plot, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/ 
911_TerrFin_App.pdf. The Commission is an independent, bipartisan entity tasked with preparing “a full 
and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.” See 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, http://govinfo.library. 
unt.edu/911/about/index.htm. 
 155 Lauren Etter, Dubai: Business Partner or Terrorist Hotbed?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2006, at A9. 
 156 Holly Yeager & Edward Alden, Arab ally senses that Bush no longer has control in Washington, 
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at 8.  
 157 Id. (noting that members of Congress said they were “flooded with calls and letters from Ameri-
cans angered by the deal”). 
   
U.S. Opposition to Asian Investment 
37:213 (2017) 
239 
 III. POLITICAL EXPLANATIONS OF ANTI-ASIAN SENTIMENT 
Having outlined a series of decisions, statements, and policies that re-
flect anti-Asian sentiment, we now turn to a related inquiry. How should we 
interpret them? Do they reflect simple racism? Political opportunism? A cau-
tious reaction to national security threats? Anxiety about the wane of U.S. 
power? The following two parts analyze a matrix of factors that underlie 
these anti-Asian expressions. In this Part, we explore four common explana-
tions of resistance to foreign investment frequently found in political science 
literature. The goal is to determine if the repeated bouts of anti-Asian senti-
ment described in Part I should be understood merely as political expedients. 
Or do they promote an Asia-phobic platform? Political explanations partially 
explain resistance to Asia in certain contexts. But they do not discount the 
possibility of other explanations of the anti-Asian sentiment described above. 
 A. Economic Nationalism 
For the economic nationalist, “the main thrust of government is to pro-
tect the economic well-being of its citizenry,” even if that involves harming 
other countries.158 As a set of policy prescriptions, economic nationalism typ-
ically aims to reduce imports, stimulate domestic production, and raise ex-
ports.159 On a macroeconomic level, this ensures a favorable balance of pay-
ments; a country will avoid trade deficits, maintain stable exchange rates, and 
keep government spending in check. On a microeconomic level, economic 
nationalism maximizes domestic employment, while keeping onshore both 
high-technology goods and the facilities that produce such goods.160 
Economic nationalism raises several issues with regards to foreign in-
vestment. Foreign investors act differently than local ones. They operate in 
new environments without the deep knowledge, strong connections, and cul-
tural embeddedness of local investors. Foreign investors often import more 
raw materials or components from their home countries, dropping local sup-
pliers.161 They may show less deference to local customs, or have little inter-
est in the environment, labor practices, and surrounding communities.162 Fi-
nally, they may repatriate their profits back to their home countries, depriving 
host countries of capital for jobs, investment, research and development, and 
other uses. 
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The economic nationalist casts a suspicious eye on any foreign invest-
ment. Yet the United States, to the extent it has an investment policy,163 has 
largely eschewed economic nationalism. As described in Part I, the United 
States has welcomed (most) foreign investment, and called on other states to 
lower their barriers to foreign investment.164 To be sure, broad policy goals 
need not constrain individual acts or statements. If a particular transaction 
threatens the national interest, the government should step in to block the 
deal. 
The issue then becomes, how does blocking foreign investments ad-
vance U.S. economic interests? Let us examine a couple of the deals dis-
cussed above. Economic nationalism may partially explain resistance to Mid-
dle Eastern portfolio investment. It is possible that a foreign investor could 
buy a sufficient number of shares to force a hostile takeover, as James Gold-
smith attempted to do with Goodyear in the 1980s.165 But hostile takeovers 
by foreign companies are exceedingly rare.166 Moreover, it is usually compa-
nies that engage in foreign hostile takeovers.167 As noted, Middle Eastern in-
vestors, whether individuals or government investors, sought primarily to di-
versify their portfolios.168 In no case did Middle Eastern investors attempt to 
acquire a company, much less seek to tank companies in which they had 
bought shares. Instead, fear of the unknown, buoyed by a widespread anxiety 
about Arabs,169 prompted the resistance to portfolio investment. 
What about the Fujitsu-Fairchild case? Certainly, economic nationalism 
weighed on the minds of several federal officials. The Defense Department 
worried that Fujitsu would refuse to sell microchips used in military systems 
to U.S. computer makers.170 This would render U.S. companies excessively 
 
 163 Several writers opine that the United States until recently lacked a basic policy on inbound invest-
ment. See Robert T. Kudrle & Davis B. Bobrow, U.S. Policy Toward Foreign Direct Investment, 34 
WORLD POL. 353, 364 (1982); ROBERT A. PASTOR, CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF U.S. FOREIGN 
ECONOMIC POLICY, 1929–1976, at 217 (1980) (“Until 1973, a host government investment policy was 
something other governments had [but not the US]” . . . .). 
 164 See Mark Vallianatos, Multilateral Agreement on Investment: International flows of private in-
vestment have risen sharply in recent years, FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS, July 1, 1997, fpif.org/multilat-
eral_agreement_on_investment (“Washington has long used diplomatic pressure, international advocacy, 
and the leverage of bilateral and multilateral aid to encourage nations to deregulate foreign investment 
(not to mention some sordid episodes of gunboat diplomacy and covert operations against governments 
perceived as threatening large U.S. investors”).  
 165 For more on the hostile takeover, see infra, notes 266–67 and corresponding text. 
 166 According to a G.A.O. report, fewer than one percent of acquisitions involve foreign hostile take-
over. In 1987, for instance, just over one-tenth of one percent (4 of 3,524) of acquisitions were foreign 
hostile takeovers. Several years saw an even smaller percentage. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT: FOREIGN HOSTILE TAKEOVERS OF U.S. FIRMS, Dec. 1988, 6, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/90/88258.pdf. 
 167 Martin Tolchin, Hostile Bids By Foreigners On the Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1988, at D1. 
 168 See supra, note 34. 
 169 See supra, note 25.  
 170 Sanger, supra note 104.  
   
U.S. Opposition to Asian Investment 
37:213 (2017) 
241 
reliant upon foreign suppliers for sophisticated electronics.171 Defense also 
expressed concern about a domino effect; the acquisition of one U.S. semi-
conductor company would lead to the downfall of the entire U.S. chip indus-
try, and extinguish U.S. productive capacities.172 The Commerce Department 
likewise seized on the deal as a way to gain leverage over Japan, and compel 
the Japanese government to reduce trade frictions in other sectors.173 In sum, 
the transaction came to represent the larger U.S.–Japan trade imbalance. As 
one senior U.S. official put it, “If Japan can come in and buy this company, 
it can come in and buy them all over the place. We don’t want to see the 
semiconductor industry under Japanese control.”174 Facing such a threat, the 
U.S. government needed to “get tough” with Japan. 
At the same time, contemporary analysts called the concerns of eco-
nomic nationalism a “smokescreen.”175 First, the United States could still ex-
ert leverage over an entity owned by Fujitsu. The Defense Department had 
many military contracts with Fairchild, and could have worked with other 
suppliers if a Japanese-owned Fairchild failed to supply them.176 Second, if 
military contracts were indeed a concern, CFIUS could have negotiated a 
mitigation agreement to ensure that sensitive technologies remained in the 
proper hands.177 If Fairchild produced sensitive military technology, that part 
of the business could be split off and sold to a domestic company.178 With a 
bit of negotiation, the government and the parties could likely have reached 
an agreement. 
Likewise, concerns that corporate Japan would come to dominate the 
U.S. technology sector seem misplaced. Fairchild, by the mid-1980s, was 
hemorrhaging hundreds of millions of dollars per year.179 Schlumberger 
 
 171 Id. 
 172 Peter T. Kilborn, 2 in Cabinet Fight Sale To Japanese: U.S. Bar Asked On Fujitsu Deal For Chip 
Maker COMPANY NEWS Japan-Fairchild Deal Opposed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1987, at D1. 
 173 Sanger, supra note 104. 
 174 Kilborn, supra note 172. 
 175 Sanger, supra note 104.  
 176 Kilborn, supra note 172. 
 177 During the review process, CFIUS may negotiate a mitigation agreement to ensure that particularly 
sensitive technologies remain in the proper hands. This can involve installing firewalls, requiring report-
ing obligations, and even selling off parts of the company to other domestic companies. Steptoe & John-
son, CFIUS Report: Significant Increase in Scuttled Deals, Jan. 8, 2014, www.steptoe.com/publications-
9273.html. 
 178 When Chinese company Wanxiang bought U.S. technology firm A123, Wanxiang agreed to sell 
the sensitive military contracts to a third party U.S. firm. See Julie Wenrau, Navitas key to sale of A123 
to Chinese firm, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 2013, at 2.1. 
 179 See Daniel F. Cuff, Schlumberger Plans $485 Million Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1985, at D4 
(noting that Fairchild’s parent company would take a $485 million charge against earnings from the trou-
bled Fairchild division, which was expected to lose $140 million in 1985); Funding Universe, National 
Semiconductor Corporation History, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/ 
national-semiconductor-corporation-history (noting that Fairchild lost a total of $265 million in 1985 and 
1986). 
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bought Fairchild in 1979 for $425 million, and planned to sell it, seven years 
later, for $200 million. But for the U.S. government’s intervention, it proba-
bly would have. Ultimately, a U.S. company bought Fairchild for $122 mil-
lion, a “steal” according to contemporary analysts.180 Schlumberger, the 
French multinational that purchased the company without controversy in 
1979, incurred a 70% loss on its seven-year investment. 
The Fairchild deal did not reflect the state of the U.S. semiconductor 
industry. According to current research, the United States produces 51% of 
the world’s semiconductors, while Japan produces just 12%.181 In the end, 
Fairchild lost the autonomy to select its business partner, a key feature of the 
market economy.182 Government intervention ultimately decided the fate of 
the transaction. Fairchild executives pursued Fujitsu specifically, believing 
that company’s investment would strengthen Fairchild’s position in the 
United States, and keep high-tech jobs there.183 
Economic nationalism offers plausible reasons to oppose certain foreign 
investments. On closer inspection, however, some of these concerns melt 
away. A pure economic nationalist would oppose any foreign investment. A 
less committed one might express concern about the fate of a particular do-
mestic industry, and genuine fear that a foreign investment from a rival coun-
try might further imperil that industry. It is important to note that, at least in 
the contexts described here, the domestic industry did not wither away, and 
that, in retrospect, such concerns may have been exaggerated. 
 B. National Security 
Government actors frequently oppose foreign investments on national 
security grounds. In reality, few foreign investments pose credible threats to 
national security.184 This incongruity should give us pause. As a former chair-
woman of the U.S. International Trade Commission put it, “clothespin, pea-
nut, pottery, shoe, pen, paper and pencil manufacturers have tried to justify 
 
 180 Victor Zonana, Schlumberger Will Sell Its Ailing Fairchild Unit: National Semiconductor Will Pay 
$122 Million; Analysts Describe Deal for Chip Maker as a ‘Steal,’, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1987, at 1. 
 181 Falan Yinug, Made in America: The Facts about Semiconductor Manufacturing, SEMICONDUCTOR 
IND. ASSOC. 3 (2015), http://www.semiconductors.org/ clientuploads/Industry%20 
Statistics/FINAL%20Made%20in%20America%20white%20paper%20%2008192015%20as%20 
posted.pdf. 
 182 William C. Rempel & Donna K.H. Walters, The Fairchild Deal: Trade War: When Chips Were 
Down, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1987, at 2. 
 183 Kilborn, supra note 172. 
 184 See THEODORE H. MORAN, THREE THREATS: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE CFIUS 
PROCESS ix (2009) (positing that the vast majority of foreign investments pose no genuine national secu-
rity risk). 
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government protection by invoking national security.”185 One could add sev-
eral other globally traded commodities—pork,186 oil,187 and steel188—that 
members of Congress have recently dubbed national security threats in op-
posing individual transactions.189 
Foreign investment threatens national security in three ways.190 First, a 
foreign acquisition may render other U.S. companies, such as defense con-
tractors, excessively reliant upon a foreign-owned entity. If the foreign-
owned entity delays or withholds certain goods, the contractor may be unable 
to complete its task, potentially disrupting national security. Second, the for-
eign-owned entity could deploy its newly gained technology to harm U.S. 
national interests. Third, the foreign-owned entity could use the acquisition 
to surveil, infiltrate, or sabotage U.S. national interests.191 These issues are 
addressed in turn. 
Before one can credibly claim that a foreign investment poses a threat 
to national security, certain conditions must be met. In the first scenario—
denial or delay to defense contractor supply chains—we must know how 
readily available the particular good or technology is. Are substitutes easily 
accessible? Could one find a new product or producer? Would it be costly? 
If the foreign-invested entity denies the good or service, could U.S. entities 
find the good elsewhere in the market? Semiconductors (Fujitsu), oil 
(CNOOC), and capital (Middle Eastern portfolio investment) are not unique 
commodities. Instead, they are largely interchangeable. If U.S. consumers 
cannot buy gas at Unocal, they could do so at Shell, Texaco, Citgo, or other 
 
 185 Susan Liebeler & William H. Lash III, Exon-Florio: Harbinger of Economic Nationalism, CATO 
REV. BUS. & GOV. 44, 49 (1993). 
 186 Marilyn Geewax, Can a Huge Hog Deal Pose a National Security Risk?, NPR, May 31, 2013 
(noting opposition from Charles Grassley, Republican of Iowa, and Rosa DeLauro, Democrat of Connect-
icut); See also Nathan Halverson, Who’s behind the Chinese takeover of the world’s biggest pork pro-
ducer, PBS (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/whos-behind-chinese-takeover-worlds-
biggest-pork-producer/ (noting comments from Senator Debbie Stabenow, Democrat of Michigan, who 
described food as a strategic resource that should be as important to the U.S. government as oil). 
 187 See supra notes 120–26 and accompanying text. 
 188 See Wendy Leung et al., Anshan Steel Postpones U.S. Investment on Objection, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS, Aug. 19, 2010 (quoting Representative Tim Murphy as saying a Chinese acquisition of a U.S. steel 
maker would both undermine the domestic steel market and pose “serious national security concerns”). 
 189 Given that pork, oil and steel are globally traded commodities, it is difficult to imagine how a 
foreign acquisition of a domestic producer could seriously jeopardize their availability. Presumably, other 
suppliers of the commodity exist, either inside or outside the United States. Even personal computers—
hardly a rare commodity—were thought to present national security concerns when a Chinese company 
sought to buy IBM’s personal computer division. See Steve Lohr, Is I.B.M.’s Lenovo Proposal a National 
Security Threat?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005, at C6 (describing a letter from three Members of Congress 
to the Treasury Secretary seeking a review of the proposed transaction). 
 190 This analysis draws on Theodore Moran’s useful three-part schema to determine national security 
threats from foreign acquisitions. See MORAN, supra note 184, at 19.  
 191 Id. 
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stations. It is difficult to see how these investments, had they been consum-
mated, would harm the national interest. 
In the second scenario, the foreign entity uses its newly acquired tech-
nology or capacity to harm U.S. national interests. Citing the above exam-
ples, Fujitsu would produce Fairchild’s semiconductors, or CNOOC would 
direct the flow of Unocal oil.192 Neither scenario would necessarily disrupt 
or injure the U.S. economy, defense industry, or other national interest. 
Moreover, how likely is this to happen? The answer hinges upon how ad-
vanced, and how widely known, the technologies are. If Fairchild manufac-
tured a semiconductor that could not be easily reproduced, Fujitsu could then 
use that technology against U.S. national interests. It could refuse to sell the 
semiconductor to military contractors. This would pose a problem, though 
not an insoluble one. Information about the product, including harmful uses, 
emerges in the CFIUS review process. If evidence, as opposed to speculation, 
shows that the technology harms national interests, CFIUS can (and often 
does) negotiate a mitigation agreement.193 For example, it could require Fu-
jitsu to sell off the militarily sensitive portions of Fairchild’s business. 
The national security implications of the CNOOC acquisition likewise 
require some probing. Taking congressional witnesses at their word,194 
CNOOC would either deprive the United States of oil reserves or absorb sen-
sitive seismic technologies. The threat of diminished oil access, as discussed, 
seems highly improbable, both because oil is a globally traded commodity, 
and because Unocal had a rather limited supply. Moreover, CFIUS could 
have ordered Unocal to sell its seismic technology business to a third party. 
Structured in this way, the transaction still would have denied the Chinese 
government, CNOOC’s main shareholder, access to putatively sensitive tech-
nologies. Such a measured, evidence-based response would ensure proper 
decision-making at the highest levels. It would guarantee that Chinese inves-
tors, like any other foreign investors, enjoy access to the U.S. market—some-
thing the United States is keen to accomplish in China and other places.195 
That leaves the third threat: infiltration or sabotage by a foreign govern-
ment. The Dubai Ports World acquisition, or an investment by Chinese tech-
nology firm Huawei, conceivably posed this type of threat. In Dubai Ports 
 
 192 During a congressional hearing, experts claimed that Unocal possessed seismic technology that 
could measure underground nuclear test explosions. A congressional advisor warned that “China does not 
have this technology, and it would be dangerous for them to obtain it.” Robert Collier, Backlash to Chinese 
bid for Unocal/Bush urged to block takeover because of energy, security fears, SFGATE (June 24, 2005), 
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Backlash-to-Chinese-bid-for-Unocal-Bush-urged-2626223.php.  
 193 One study suggests that, between 2009 and 2011, eight percent of all cases CFIUS reviewed used 
legally binding mitigation agreements. Organization for International Investment, Understanding the 
CFIUS Process, 3 (2013), http://www.ofii.org/sites/default/files/OFII_CFIUS_Primer.pdf. 
 194 Unocal denied that it possessed these sensitive seismic technologies. Collier, supra note 192. 
 195 Citing free trade and efficiency concerns, Exxon CEO Lee Raymond said it would be a “big mis-
take” for the United States to block CNOOC’s acquisition of Unocal. Id. 
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World, Congress feared an Arab-owned company would inadequately super-
vise U.S. ports.196 At the very least, it would provide less security than a Brit-
ish-owned company.197 How serious was the threat that DPW would sabotage 
ports or otherwise compromise national security? 
First, it is federal agencies, not private companies, that maintain the 
safety of U.S. ports. Customs and Border Patrol performs this service by in-
specting cargo that arrives into U.S. ports.198 Attaching responsibility for port 
safety to the port operator is like attaching responsibility for airport security 
to United or Delta. Moreover, no one in Congress adduced evidence of 
DPW’s neglect in operating other ports around the world. 
Second, CFIUS reviewed, and then authorized, the DPW transaction. 
High-level officials from State, Defense, Treasury, Homeland Security, and 
others testified before Congress that their respective department’s review had 
been “rigorous,” “in-depth” and “comprehensive.”199 Even within a single 
department, several agencies conducted independent reviews.200 CFIUS’s ap-
proval was not given casually. In addition, the Department of Homeland Se-
curity—as the agency responsible for port safety—negotiated an assurance 
letter with DPW,201 requiring DPW to participate in ongoing anti-terrorism 
initiatives, to enforce certain security protocols, and to provide law enforce-
ment—without a subpoena—information on terminal operations, employees, 
and security programs.202 Yet these extraordinary measures did not satisfy 
Congress, which ultimately passed a law specifically prohibiting DPW’s ac-
quisition. 
 
 196 It is important to note that the issue was not foreign ownership of a U.S. ports operator, as a British 
company (P&O) then owned the ports. The issue was specifically about whether a Dubai-based company 
should be trusted to operate ports in the United States. 
 197 David E. Sanger & Eric Lipton, Bush Would Veto Any Bill Halting Dubai Port Deal, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 22, 2006, at A1 (citing concerns of Bill Frist, Dennis Hastert, Charles Schumer, and Hilary Clinton). 
 198 The Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) “is responsible for 
conducting immigration and customs inspections for aliens entering the United States at officials border 
crossings . . . . CBP also is responsible for conducting customs-related inspections of cargo at ports of 
entry and for ensuring that all goods entering the United States do so legally.” U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-375, HOMELAND SECURITY: PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TO ADDRESS 
THE VULNERABILITIES EXPOSED BY 9/11, BUT CONTINUED FEDERAL ACTION IS NEEDED TO FURTHER 
MITIGATE SECURITY RISKS 19 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/255650.pdf. 
 199 See generally National Security Implications of the Acquisition of Peninsular and Oriental Steam-
ship Navigation Company by Dubai Ports World: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Armed Services, 
109th Cong., 2d sess., Feb. 23, 2006 (containing statements by high-level officials from Defense, State, 
Treasury, and Homeland Security) [hereinafter Dubai Hearings], http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg32744/html/CHRG-109shrg32744.htm. 
 200 See id. at 8 (statement of Gordon England, Dep. Sec. Def.) (noting the Army, Navy, Air Force, 
Defense Security Service, Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, Transportation 
Command and Defense Information Systems Agency). 
 201 See id. at 11 (statement of Robert Kimmitt, Dep. Sec. Treasury). 
 202 Id. at 14 (statement of Michael Jackson, Dep. Sec. Homeland Security). The letter also included 
an enforcement mechanism that permitted DHS to seek remedies for false or misleading representations, 
as well as omission of material information. Id. 
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What about Huawei, the Chinese electronic and telecommunications 
company with close ties to the Chinese Army? Security analysts were split 
on whether Huawei investments would facilitate cyber-espionage or other-
wise compromise U.S. national security.203 As one scholar put it, commen-
tary “remained divided” between those who found a bona fide threat to na-
tional security, and those who succumbed to “anti-Chinese hysteria and 
behind-the-scenes maneuvering by . . . U.S. competitors.”204 In at least this 
case, then, foreign investment may have presented a national security risk. At 
the very least, one cannot definitively rule out the possibility.205 Later, a re-
port by the U.S. House Intelligence Committee underscored the potential 
threat of Huawei acquisitions, though it presented no evidence of cyber-es-
pionage to date.206 Given the underlying uncertainties surrounding techno-
logical infiltration and surveillance, one should approach the national secu-
rity rationale cautiously. Better still would be concrete evidence of a national 
security threat, particularly when a company—such as Huawei or Dubai 
Ports World—operates in scores of other jurisdictions without reports of se-
curity breaches. 
In sum, one can never fully exclude the possibility that a foreign invest-
ment will threaten national security. That does not mean, however, any 
charge of a security threat can be taken at face value. Government actors 
(among others) should specify the nature of the harm and consider ways to 
avoid the potential threat. In the final analysis, the possibility that a foreign 
investment would harm national security is ineradicable, but that does not 
excuse government officials from articulating their concerns in a clear man-
ner. 
 
 203 MORAN, supra note 184, at 28. 
 204 Id. 
 205 We now know, in the wake of revelations by Edward Snowden, that U.S. internet and technology 
companies collaborated with the National Security Agency to insert entry points (or “back doors”) into 
various products, which in turn allowed the U.S. government to spy on other governments. See Nicole 
Perlroth, Jeff Larson & Scott Shane, N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 6, 2013, at A1. It is conceivable, then, that other governments may work with their own national 
champions to do the same thing in the United States.  
 206 In 2012, the House Intelligence Committee released a very damning report about Huawei and ZTE 
(another Chinese telecommunications company). The report uses very tough language to describe the 
threat to national security that these two companies supposedly pose. Yet, in the publicly released version, 
the report cites no evidence of spying by either Huawei or ZTE. Joseph Menn, White-House ordered 
review found no evidence of Huawei spying, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/ 
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government and Communist Party. U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on In-
telligence, Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunica-
tions Companies Huawei and ZTE, 112th Cong., Oct. 8, 2012, https://intelligence.house.gov/ 
sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/Huawei-ZTE%20Investigative%20Report%20 
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 C. RECIPROCITY 
A third refrain emphasizes the lack of reciprocity207 between the United 
States and various Asian countries.208 According to Curtis Milhaupt, the 
“largest underlying cause of friction over Japanese FDI in the 1980s was the 
perception that while the United States was open to Japanese investment and 
imports, U.S. firms faced substantial barriers to trade in Japan.”209 The prin-
ciple of reciprocity holds that Country A’s treatment of foreign investors 
from Country B should be no better, or worse, than Country B’s treatment of 
foreign investors from Country A.210 Specifically, if the U.S. government al-
lows a Chinese company to invest in the U.S. technology sector, the Chinese 
government should permit a U.S. company to invest in the Chinese technol-
ogy sector.211 
To be sure, reciprocity undergirds much of international investment law, 
including many bilateral investment treaties. At the same time, the United 
States has traditionally maintained an open investment environment—far 
more open than many of its trading partners. To insist on reciprocity would 
seriously challenge even traditional partners like Canada (which requires au-
thorization for every foreign investment),212 France (which requires scrutiny 
of investments in the fields of water, public health and transportation),213 and 
 
 207 This is also known as the principle of equality, most favored nation, or non-discrimination. While 
these concepts have differences in nuance, they basically address the same issue: treating foreign investors 
as favorably as domestic ones. See KRISTA NADAKAVUKAREN SCHEFER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW: TEXT, CASES & MATERIALS 13 (2013). 
 208 See, e.g., Reciprocal Trade and Investment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Trade of the 
Comm. on Fin., Sen. Fin. Comm., 98th Cong. 1. (1983). The hearing discussed the Reciprocal Trade and 
Investment Act, a bill to “ensure that U.S. exporters receive fair and equitable market access opportunities 
in foreign markets . . . [by] negotiating mandates in the areas of trade in services, high technology products 
and investment performance.” (statement of Sen. Danforth, Chair, Sen. Fin. Comm.). The bill was widely 
seen as targeting “the contrived and unfair trade barriers in Japan.” Id. at 8 (statement of Sen. David Boren, 
Member, Sen. Fin. Comm.). 
 209 Curtis Milhaupt, Lessons from Japan’s experience in the 1980s in INVESTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES: IS THE U.S. READY FOR FDI FROM CHINA? 185, 193 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009). 
 210 In this way, reciprocity resembles most favored nation status: the host country can treat foreign 
investors no less favorably.  
 211 Take the case of 3com and Huawei. In 2003, the Chinese government approved the establishment 
of a joint venture between the two companies. In 2008, 3com bought 49% share of Huawei. Later, when 
Huawei tried to enter the U.S. market, CFIUS did not grant its approval, signaling it would block the 
investment if it had gone forward. 
 212 Canada is one of the few countries to review and require approval for all foreign investments. 
Canada also places greater restrictions on foreign equity ownership than similarly wealthy developed 
countries. See Y. Beth Riley, Foreign Direct Investment Restrictions in Canada, 3–4 (March 2011), 
https://www.bennettjones.com/Publications/Articles/Foreign_Direct_Investment_Restrictions_in_ 
Canada. 
 213 Fabrice Fages, François Mary & Bénédicte Bremond, Latham & Watkins Client Alert Commentary 
No. 1688: New French Regulations Tighten Control on Foreign Investments (May 16, 2014), 
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/New-French-Regs-Tighten-Control-on-Foreign-Investments 
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Germany (which extends preferential treatment to European investors, but 
not U.S. investors or other non-Europeans).214 It would be counterproductive 
to review inbound investment with reference to the home state’s investment 
law. 
Moreover, insisting on reciprocity would dilute the United States’ 
longstanding commitment to lowering investment barriers. If the United 
States advocates merely for replicating the investment law of its trading part-
ners, as reciprocity would require, the United States would forego much of 
the work it has done on the multilateral level.215 It would also run counter to 
the United States’ long-held policy on foreign investment.216 The idea of rec-
iprocity may have intuitive appeal, but it would be nearly impossible to im-
plement. In any event, it would set the United States back decades in its ef-
forts to lower international obstacles to trade and investment. Reciprocity, 
then, does not provide a sufficiently persuasive reason to oppose foreign in-
vestment. 
 D. Government Involvement 
A final political explanation concerns the degree of government activity 
in foreign investment decisions. Sovereign wealth funds, state-owned enter-
prises (“SOEs”), and “state-controlled” enterprises play an increasingly im-
portant role in international commerce and foreign investment.217 Undoubt-
edly, some of these investments have political goals, as opposed to the strict 
 
(explaining how France screens foreign investment in a wide and growing array of sectors). Under a 2014 
decree, the French Ministry of Economy expanded its investigatory remit from traditionally accepted stra-
tegic areas (national defense and information technology) to new areas such as energy, water, public 
health, transport and telecommunications). Id.  
 214 Under a 2009 amendment to the Foreign Trade Act, Germany can block a non-European investor 
from acquiring 25% or more of the voting rights in a German company. The regulation also applies to 
European investors when there are “indications of an abusive or circumventory structuring that is intended 
to undermine the control of the acquisition.” Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, New Restrictions on 
foreign investments in Germany, 1, May 2009. In other words, Germany treats European investors more 
favorably than U.S. investors, among other non-European, investors). This would clearly violate the most 
favored nation clause of any Bilateral Investment Treaty. 
 215 See U.S. Dep’t of State Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI): The Facts, Mar. 23, 1998 (“The MAI draft text reflects U.S. investment laws, regula-
tions and practices. Its achievement will be in bringing other countries up to the standards the United 
States already applies to all investors—domestic and foreign.”). 
 216 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2901(11)(A)(i), (ii) (explaining that “[t]he principal negotiating objective of 
the United Sates regarding foreign direct investment are to reduce or to eliminate artificial or trade-dis-
torting barriers to foreign direct investment, to expand the principle of national treatment, and to reduce 
unreasonable barriers to establishment; and to develop internationally agreed rules, including dispute set-
tlement procedures. . . .”); Foreign Inv. in the U.S.: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Fin. of the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Hous.. and Urban Affairs, 93rd Cong. (1974). 
 217 See generally Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed et al., Sovereign Investment: An Introduction, in 
SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT: CONCERNS AND POLICY REACTIONS (Karl P. Sauvant et al. eds., 2012). 
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pursuit of profits.218 This need not, in itself, cause concern. As we saw above, 
many Middle Eastern governments have used foreign investment to gain ex-
pertise, transmit knowledge and experience back to their home countries, and 
develop various domestic industries (aviation, banking, telecommunications, 
etc.). Nevertheless, there is a concern that the foreign government will deploy 
the investment as a “Trojan Horse”; it would first infiltrate the United States, 
gain a foothold here, and then harm the acquired company, domestic econ-
omy, or other national interest. In other words, national security remains the 
paramount issue, particularly “in sensitive or strategic industries,” while lack 
of transparency comes a close second.219 
Anxiety over government involvement has informed discussions about 
foreign investment for decades. In the 1970s, U.S. government officials ex-
pressed concern that the OPEC states, with their newfound wealth and “nou-
veau riche sensibilities,” would invest with “political purposes,” just as they 
had curtailed oil exports for political reasons.220 And yet, contemporaneous 
accounts from cabinet officials played down the threat of foreign-govern-
ment investment. One State Department official opined, “Our experience has 
been that foreign corporations with substantial government ownership have 
generally responded to market forces when making investments in the United 
States.”221 Moreover, just as with private enterprises, government investors 
must obey the panoply of U.S. government laws and regulations. Even then, 
some members of the U.S. government acknowledged that state-held capital 
is not that different from privately held capital. 
More recent surveys suggest that government investment strategies do 
not differ significantly from institutional investor strategies.222 Recent studies 
show that strategies of sovereign wealth funds and mutual funds largely con-
verge: both seek financial gains regardless of the political regimes in which 
they invest.223 Other studies show that sovereign wealth funds led by govern-
ment officials invest more at home than when they are led by foreign man-
agers.224 This weakens the link between politics and foreign investment be-
cause more “politicized” investors are less likely to invest abroad in the first 
 
 218 See id. at 11. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 
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A Comparison With Mutual Funds, in SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT: CONCERNS AND POLICY REACTIONS 
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place. According to Paul Rose, sovereign wealth funds have largely sought 
returns on the assets themselves, and “thus far have not made . . . invest-
ment[s] in the United States for strategic political purposes.”225 
Congress has expressed alarm over Chinese investment and potential 
government influence in cases where the investor is a government entity (like 
CITIC or CNOOC) or has close ties to the government (Huawei). Members 
of Congress have raised numerous concerns: the Chinese government could 
gain access to sensitive technologies, spy on the U.S. military from nearby 
installations, disrupt oil supplies, engage in cyber-espionage by manipulating 
computer software, and so on. Yet, as explained above, few of these concerns 
present national security threats. The purchase of a plane parts manufacturer 
by a state-owned Chinese company may sound dangerous, but the parts them-
selves were neither sensitive nor used in classified applications.226 Likewise, 
a Chinese state-owned enterprise’s bid for a U.S. oil company may indeed 
threaten U.S. oil supplies, but oil is a globally traded, fungible commodity. 
Even if the Chinese-invested enterprise diverted oil from the United States to 
China, it would remain readily available on world commodity markets. 
Moreover, recent scholarship suggests that Chinese SOEs, like sover-
eign wealth funds, act substantially similar to multinational corporations.227 
Since many SOEs are listed on stock exchanges, they are subject to market 
disciplines and shareholder concerns. They must also abide by the regula-
tions of the stock exchanges and the laws of host countries. If anything, Chi-
nese SOEs are “still learning the rules of the road”: overpaying for certain 
assets, treading clumsily into new environments, and ignoring local customs 
of doing business.228 That does not necessarily make state-controlled or state-
owned enterprises bigger threats to U.S. national interests than other multi-
national enterprises. 
Finally, pursuant to the Foreign Investment and National Security Act 
of 2007, any government-controlled entity investing in the United States—
whatever its purpose—undergoes a national security investigation.229 CFIUS 
could annul the transaction, require that the capacity to produce sensitive 
technologies remain in the United States, or devise a mitigation agreement to 
account for the sensitive technology. Of course, foreign-controlled entities 
must still obey laws on trade secrets, export controls, economic espionage, 
and so on. In short, though the issue is frequently raised, investment by gov-
ernment-owned entities has thus far not harmed U.S. national interests in the 
 
 225 Paul Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, 87 N.C. L. REV. 83, 87 (2008). 
 226 See Tom Brown, Mamco: Victim of China Anger? Firm May Have Been Target of Opportunity, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 6, 1990, at D1.  
 227 Wendy Dobson, China’s State-Owned Enterprises and Canada’s FDI Policy, UNIV. OF CALGARY 
SCH. OF PUB. POLICY SPP RESEARCH PAPER, Mar. 2014, at 1, https://www.policyschool.ca/ 
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 229 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(B). 
   




One can never definitely rule out the possibility that a foreign-govern-
ment investor might harm U.S. interests, but decades of experience should 
make us wary of such speculation. Those who would challenge an investment 
based on national security concerns should have the burden both to state spe-
cifically the nature of their concern, and to marshal evidence as to how the 
investment would endanger national security. 
In short, the above cited reasons do not fully account for the anti-Asian 
sentiment directed at foreign investment. Economic nationalist concerns 
sound plausible at first blush, but typically cannot withstand more exacting 
scrutiny. Similarly, one cannot definitively say that a government-controlled 
entity would never harm the national interest of the United States. 
Still, after forty years, no conclusive evidence has yet emerged to sup-
port the claim that a foreign investment has endangered U.S. national secu-
rity. Of course, this does not mean that no foreign investment could ever harm 
U.S. national security or its national interests. Continued vigilance is war-
ranted. But the absence of such an investment is significant. If political ex-
planations cannot fully account for the periodic rashes of anti-Asian senti-
ment, what other possibilities are there? 
 IV. RACIAL EXPLANATIONS OF ANTI-ASIAN SENTIMENT 
Contemporary racial discrimination takes various forms, from the vio-
lence of police shootings to the micro-aggressions of college campuses.230 
This Part establishes a framework to understand anti-Asian discrimination by 
drawing on racial discrimination jurisprudence, cultural theory, and critical 
legal studies. It then reviews the statements and actions of government offi-
cials during the three waves of Asian investment to show the role that race 
plays in both the construction of U.S. investment law, and in individual de-
cisions regarding foreign investment. 
Before proceeding with this analysis, however, two points require clar-
ification. First, the United States has been neither monolithic nor uniform in 
opposing Asian investment. Congress’s response to particular waves of 
Asian investment correlates with the rising economic status of particular 
 
 230 Police shootings of unarmed African-American men have generated controversy, headlines and 
debates around the United States since the August 2014 shooting of Michael Brown. See Monica Davey 
& Mitch Smith, Justice Dept. Will Investigate Chicago Police, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2015, at A10. Psy-
chologists define microaggressions as “brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral or environmental 
indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory or negative racial 
slights and insults to the target person or group.” See Derald Wing Sue et al., Racial Microaggressions in 
Everyday Life: Implications for Clinical Practice, 62 AM. PSYCH. 271, 273 (2007). See generally Brandon 
Griggs, Do U.S. Colleges Have A Race Problem?, CNN (Nov. 10, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/10/us/racism-college-campuses-protests-missouri (discussing racially 
charged events on U.S. college campuses). 
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countries. The rise of Middle Eastern economies in the 1970s, coupled with 
the oil shocks, led to wide-scale animosity against investors from those coun-
tries. Similarly, the growth of the Japanese economy, and the trade imbalance 
in particular, engendered fear and suspicion in the United States throughout 
the 1980s.231 Since the Japanese bubble burst in 1990, however, the Japan 
threat theory has largely abated. Currently, China’s economic rise dominates 
headlines and stirs up anxiety of imminent U.S. demise.232 But the United 
States still has a larger economy,233 richer per capita population,234 a more 
dominant international currency (in fact, the globally dominant currency),235 
and a stronger military.236 Some tensions in the U.S.–China relationship are 
clearly warranted.237 But we must be careful that such anxieties do not influ-
ence decisions on investment policy, which may have little to do with the 
underlying tension. 
Second, investments from smaller Asian states—Taiwan, South Korea, 
and Singapore, among others—have generated comparatively little contro-
versy. It is not the case, then, that the United States rejects all Asian invest-
ment. Rather, only when the Asian state exerts a degree of geopolitical influ-
ence do U.S. officials perceive it as a threat to principles of the market 
economy, U.S. primacy in world affairs, or the “American way of life.”238 
 
 231 Specifically, the “Arab threat” discourse of the 1970s coincided with the first signs of Arab eco-
nomic influence in the United States (and the world). The opposition to Japanese investment reached its 
peak during the zenith of Japan’s economic growth. And animosity towards Chinese investment has mir-
rored China’s own economic rise.  
 232 See Jeffery M. Jones, In U.S., Majority Still Names China as Top Economic Power, GALLUP ECON. 
(Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/160724/majority-names-china-top-economic-power.aspx 
(describing results of poll wherein 53% of U.S. citizens said China was the world’s largest economy, 
while 32% correctly identified the Unites States). Using per capita gross domestic product (i.e., GDP 
divided by population), the average U.S. citizen makes roughly ten times what the average Chinese citizen 
makes. 
 233 The World Bank estimates that, in 2014, China’s economy ($10.36 trillion) was about 60% as large 
as the United States’ ($17.42 trillion). See The World Bank, United States, www.worldbank.org/ 
en/country/unitedstates (last visited Nov. 18, 2016).  
 234 The average person in the United States annually earns $54,725, whereas the average Chinese 
earns $7,437. 
 235 The International Monetary Fund’s recent decision to include the Chinese renminbi in its basket 
of world currencies is certainly an important step in the internationalization of that currency. Yet there 
can be no doubt that “the dollar still dominates in finance and trade . . . .” Keith Bradsher, I.M.F. Adds 
China’s Currency to Elite Global Financial Club, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2015, at A1. 
 236 See David Axe, Why China is Far From Ready to Meet the U.S. on a Global Battlefront, REUTERS, 
June 22, 2015, at A1. 
 237 Cyber-security, intellectual property theft, and China’s military buildup in the South China Seas 
stand out as areas where U.S. and Chinese interests are visibly misaligned. 
 238 The threat to the “American way of life” is a common trope in congressional discussions. “From 
Wall Street to Main Street, Americans are nervous about China’s effect on the American economy, Amer-
ican jobs, on the American way of life.” Hearing on U.S.–China Relations Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 
109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus). Baucus later served as United States Ambassador to 
China under the second Obama administration. 
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This geopolitical concern is not, however, free of racial or ethnic bias, for 
why should we presume that investors from Asian countries seek to harm 
U.S. national interests? 
 A. Analytical Framework 
U.S. law recognizes two types of evidence of racial discrimination. The 
first, direct evidence, takes place when an employer tells an applicant, “We 
are not going to hire you because you are Asian.” But as the Supreme Court 
has noted, “[o]utright admissions of impermissible racial motivation are in-
frequent and plaintiffs often must rely upon other evidence.”239 In prosecut-
ing racial discrimination claims, plaintiffs frequently turn to the second type: 
indirect or circumstantial evidence.240 This includes, inter alia, suspicious 
timing of adverse actions, ambiguous statements made by superiors, system-
atically better treatment of persons outside of plaintiff’s protected group, and 
other “bits and pieces of evidence” from which inferences of discriminatory 
intent may be drawn.241 Circumstantial evidence thus comes in various forms, 
from vague verbal assertions to better treatment of different ethnic groups. 
For purposes of this framework, most evidence of racial discrimination 
discussed falls into the second category, indirect evidence. Like most racial 
discrimination lawsuits, this presents interpretive challenges. But the chal-
lenge is compounded by the fact that the U.S. government is not a single 
person or entity. Rather, it is a composite organ of agencies, elected officials, 
and appointed positions, employing thousands of people that change over 
time, presidential administrations, and election cycles. Government bodies 
themselves fluctuate; new agencies form while others dissolve or, more fre-
quently, merge into existing ones. For these reasons, the proposed framework 
does not adhere strictly to racial discrimination law, which targets discrimi-
nation by a single actor or set of actors. Instead, the primary purpose is to 
show the discriminatory nature of various government actions and state-
ments,242 as well as their harmful consequences.243 
What, then, constitutes a racially discriminatory statement? Scholars of 
cultural studies and critical legal studies have developed an expansive vocab-
ulary to describe the images, techniques and discourses Western writers use 
 
 239 Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999). 
 240 I am grateful to Andrew Pollis for this suggestion. 
 241 Abuelyaman v. Ill. State Univ., 667 F.3d 800, 809 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). 
 242 In racial discrimination lawsuits, the defendant gets the opportunity to refute the evidence that he 
acted in a discriminatory manner. Since the “federal government” is neither a discrete entity, nor a de-
fendant in this exercise, we adopt the more modest goal of showing the actions and statements of its 
representatives reflect racial bias.  
 243 Racial discrimination plaintiffs must also show that the discrimination constituted a “determinative 
factor” in an “adverse action” against them. See Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 57 (1st Cir. 
1999). 
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to criticize, categorize, and control Asian subjects. The seminal text in re-
vealing Western prejudices about Asia is Edward Said’s Orientalism. In de-
scribing centuries of Western thinking about Asia, Said posits four main prin-
ciples or “dogmas”: 
[1] One is the absolute and systematic difference between the West, 
which is rational, developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which 
is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior. [2] Another dogma is that abstrac-
tions about the Orient . . . are always preferable to direct evidence 
drawn from modern Oriental realities. [3] A third dogma is that the 
Orient is eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself . . . .  [4] A 
fourth dogma is that the Orient is at bottom something either to be 
feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown dominions) or 
to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright 
occupation whenever possible).244 
For Said, and many writing in his wake, Western observers adopt a baseline 
of images, stereotypes, and conventions to view Asia.245 Said’s own work 
focused primarily on European representations (literary, artistic, and philo-
sophical) of Arabs during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These im-
ages portrayed Arabs as weak, passive, backward, irrational, and even pre-
historic.246 More important, Said drew clear parallels between the historical 
images of Arabs and U.S. government policy towards the Middle East.247 
Thus, stereotyped views of Asians may exert influence on the formulation 
and execution of U.S. foreign policy.248 
But what about the rest of Asia? Can the concept of Orientalism cover 
so broad a swath? Some would say “no.” China is different from Kuwait. 
And the immense variety of languages, cultures, religions, and ethnicities 
found in Asia simply defies an all-encompassing term like Orientalism.249 
But many scholars would reply “yes.” Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha 
have applied Said’s insights to reveal orientalist understandings of South 
Asia.250 Scholars have also extended the Orientalist critique to Southeast 
 
 244 EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 300–01 (1978). 
 245 In this paper, I use the more current term Asian, instead of Oriental. 
 246 SAID, supra note 244, at 49 (“On the one hand there are Westerners, and on the other there are 
Arab-Orientals; the former are . . . rational, peaceful, liberal, logical, capable of holding real values, with-
out natural suspicion; the latter are none of these things.”). 
 247 Id. at 47–49. Said cites articles written by U.S. State Department officials (including Henry Kis-
singer) that claim that citizens of developing countries experience “empirical reality” differently from 
Westerners. Moreover, some of these articles claim “the art of subterfuge is highly developed in Arab 
life.” Id. 
 248 See generally JOHN KUO WEI TCHEN & DYLAN YEATS, YELLOW PERIL! AN ARCHIVE OF ANTI-
ASIAN FEAR (2014) (linking contemporary anti-Asian discourses to European colonialism and the enlight-
enment). 
 249 I thank Sharona Hoffman for this point. 
 250 Gayatri C. Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF 
   




With regards to Japan, the recourse to stereotypes, feelings of superior-
ity, and the sense of an unbridgeable divide between East and West recur 
regularly in Western conceptions of Japan. As David Morley and Kevin Rob-
ins write: 
The West can never see Japan directly. . . . [The] Japanese were al-
ways destined to be seen through the fears and fantasies of Europeans 
and Americans. Japan is the Orient, containing all the West most lacks 
and everything it most fears. Against Japanese difference, the West 
fortifies and defends what it sees as its superior culture and identity. 
And so the West’s imaginary Japan works to consolidate old mystifi-
cations and stereotypes . . . .252 
Orientalism also helps explain Western interactions with China. As 
Teemu Ruskola shows, the West’s concern that China lacks law has had se-
rious consequences for both the United States and China, including the 
abridgement and violation of the rights of Chinese citizens and Chinese-
Americans.253 
Orientalism’s wide remit is not entirely surprising. Racial prejudice 
rarely relies on analytic precision, scientific evidence, or geographical cor-
rectness.254 One does not usually form racist attitudes after calm and deliber-
ate reflection, or extended experience alongside the other group. It has a ma-
terial presence and rhetorical force, if not an internal consistency. Instead, as 
 
CULTURE 271 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988) (dissecting Western analyses of Indian 
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 254 To be sure, scientists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries mobilized scientific methods 
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Gerald Torres argues, racism is about domination, dehumanization, and dif-
ferentiation.255 As Naoki Sakai has argued: 
The Orient does not connote any internal commonality among the 
names subsumed under it; it ranges from regions in the Middle East 
to those in the Far East. One can hardly find anything religious, lin-
guistic, or cultural that is common among these varied areas. . . . The 
principle of its identity lies outside itself: . . . the Orient is that which 
is excluded and objectified by the West in the service of its historical 
progress.256 
In other words, Orientalism says as much about our preoccupations with our 
position in global affairs as it does about the empirical reality or shared com-
monality of any particular Asian country or people. It may lack a consistent 
doctrinal basis, but it also provides a powerful set of images, stereotypes, and 
discourses that can be mobilized to oppress, dominate, or persecute an ill-
defined group of people.257 U.S. officials generalize about Asians—whether 
Arabs, Chinese, Japanese, or others—with surprising ease. This stands in di-
rect contrast to the specific way in which they discuss investors from the 
West. 
Critical legal scholars have also applied Said’s basic insight to examine 
the treatment of Asians and Asian-Americans in the U.S. legal system. Three 
themes in particular resonate with the present inquiry. First, Asians and 
Asian-Americans remain foreign. Even though the first waves of Asian im-
migrants came to the United States in the early to mid-19th century, long 
before many Europeans passed through Ellis Island, Asian-Americans con-
tinue to be seen as outsiders—unknowable entities never fully incorporated 
into the U.S. body politic.258 This ineradicable foreignness prevents Asians 
and Asian-Americans from finding widespread acceptance within U.S. soci-
ety.259 
Second, by virtue of this “alienness,” Asians are frequently considered 
 
 255 See generally Gerald Torres, Introduction: Understanding Environmental Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. 
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threats to national security. From the Yellow Peril260 to Wen-Ho Lee,261 
Asians incite mistrust among the U.S. public, media, and political classes that 
is largely disproportionate to the threat they actually pose.262 The Korematsu 
decision, where the Supreme Court upheld President Roosevelt’s order to in-
tern 121,000 Japanese-Americans (including 70,000 citizens), reinforces the 
view of Asians as disloyal to the United States, and allegiant to their home 
countries.263 
Third, because of the putative security threat, the rise of Asia is linked 
to the decline of the United States. Here too, the Yellow Peril discourse is the 
intellectual forebear. Consider the figure of Dr. Fu Manchu—the “yellow 
peril incarnate in one man,” as his creator Sax Rohmer once described him.264 
A staple of twentieth-century novels, films, comic books, and radio pro-
grams, Fu Manchu used his “Western intellect and Eastern cunning to try to 
destroy Western Civilization and beat it at its own game of world con-
quest.”265 Fu Manchu may seem like an outdated embodiment of earlier racist 
times. But contemporary politicians deploy similar language to oppose Asian 
investment. Middle Eastern investors would buy stocks in U.S. companies 
only to take control and crash them.266 Japanese companies would acquire, 
and then devour or destroy, their U.S. competitors, especially in the techno-
logical fields.267 Chinese enterprises will lock up oil reserves in other parts 
of the world, choke off U.S. supply, and replace the United States as world 
hegemon.268 
 
 260 See generally TCHEN & YEATS, supra note 248. 
 261 Wen Ho Lee was a Taiwan-born physicist at Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory. He was accused of 
espionage, fired from his job, indicted on fifty-nine counts of mishandling government information. He 
was ultimately cleared on all counts, save one: mishandling computer files. See Neil Gotanda, Compara-
tive Racialization: Racial Profiling and the Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689 (2000). Lee later 
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CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2012 (2012), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
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 263 See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Korematsu often ranks alongside 
Dred Scott and Plessy as the worst Supreme Court decisions of all times. See Jamal Greene, The Anti-
canon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (2011) (surveying the “weak constitutional analysis” of four Supreme 
Court decisions, including Korematsu); Carol J. Williams, Legal scholars examine the U.S. high court’s 
‘Supreme Mistakes,’ L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2011 (describing a Pepperdine Law School conference—featur-
ing Professors Akhil Amar, Erwin Chemerinsky, Daniel Farber, and others—reviewing the worst Supreme 
Court decisions). 
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 266 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
 267 See supra notes 92–100 and accompanying text. 
 268 See supra notes 120–129 and accompanying text. 
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 B. Middle Eastern Investment 
Congress’s reaction to Middle Eastern investment in the 1970s insti-
gated the first U.S. laws and regulations on international investment. Sena-
tors Jacob Javits and Howard Metzenbaum raised numerous concerns about 
investment from the Middle East. Specifically, they complained of Arab 
“technological backwardness,” “nouveau riche” sensibilities, and “reckless 
disregard for public responsibility.” It is not simply the derogatory content of 
these remarks. The broader issue is the failure to investigate the motivations 
of “Arab investors” before attempting to restrict their access to the United 
States. To paraphrase Said, abstract caricature was preferred to direct evi-
dence of the danger posed by these investors. 
These two senators, among others, introduced bills to restrict, limit, or 
require public disclosure of foreign investments.269 No bill mentioned Asian 
investment by name, yet they responded to the infusion of Middle Eastern 
portfolio investment.270 In the end, only one of the proposed bills that sought 
to “collect limited amounts of information” on foreign investment became 
law.271 One might argue, then, that there was no “action,” just a lot of acri-
monious speech. Yet congressional pressure spurred President Ford into es-
tablishing CFIUS. But for Congress, the Ford Administration would proba-
bly not have created CFIUS. The Committee was born in a moment of 
congressional hostility toward Middle Eastern investment.272 
Middle Eastern investors themselves noted the government’s condem-
natory attitude.273 In private meetings with U.S. officials, Saudi investors re-
portedly reassured their counterparts that they did not seek to take over or 
destroy U.S. companies.274 As one Saudi petroleum official noted, perhaps 
with an oblique nod to the former ownership of Saudi natural resources by 
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U.S. companies,275 “We don’t have in mind any idea of control of your nat-
ural resources.”276 
Gulf state investors met with government officials to learn which indus-
tries were closed to foreign investment. Saudi officials in particular used in-
formal consultations before making major investments, suggesting the anxi-
ety both sides felt about U.S. popular reaction to Saudi investment. It is 
unclear if the congressional reaction diminished Saudi investment.277 
 C. Japanese Investment 
Negative reactions to Japanese investment in the 1980s likewise drew 
on old and inaccurate images of Japan. Looking at the totality of the evidence, 
racism probably played an even more prominent role than it did in the reac-
tion to Middle Eastern investment in the 1970s. With Japan, it was not simply 
a small number of Senators who expressed concern, but a diverse array of 
members of Congress. 
In opposing Japanese investment, members of Congress hewed closely 
the Orientalist discourse explicated by Said. According to Representative 
Pete Stark, the Japanese were: 
A people (some have used the word clan) who have lived by them-
selves on a set of islands for nearly 2,000 years of recorded time do 
not readily buy from outsiders. There is no GATT, there is no law, 
there is no treaty, there is no negotiation that is going to change that.278 
This recalls the Orientalist technique of portraying Asians as timeless, eter-
nal, and unchanging—a pre-rational and pre-modern foil to the West. Simi-
larly, Senator Pete Wilson called Japan a “drug addict,” hooked on “preda-
tory trade practices,” and incapable of reforming itself.279 This too draws on 
Orientalist tropes, and perhaps even confuses Japan with China, which had 
an opium epidemic in the early nineteenth century.280 
More problematic is the latent “legal orientalism” lurking in these state-
ments. Teemu Ruskola has defined “legal orientalism” as a set of discursive 
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about/history/1980s.html. 
 276 Cowan, supra note 273. 
 277 One Saudi official did, however, note that Saudi would decrease its investment in the United States, 
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Cultures, http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/opium_wars_01/ow1_essay01.html. 
   
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 37:213 (2017) 
260 
practices that Western commentators use to determine “what is and is not 
law, and who are and are not its proper subjects” in various Asian jurisdic-
tions.281 Ruskola’s critique focuses mainly on Western characterizations of 
Chinese “lawlessness.” But his critique applies with equal force to U.S. con-
ceptions of Japan. Stark’s depiction of a timeless Japan—isolated from the 
rest of the world, impervious to change, with a blatant disregard for interna-
tional law—misrepresents Japanese notions of legality and the importance of 
international law in Japan. 
The Fujitsu-Fairchild transaction also reflects this differential treatment. 
When Schlumberger bought Fairchild in 1979, no one objected that a French 
company was purchasing a U.S. icon.282 But when a Japanese company bid 
on the same company, the U.S. government balked. In either case, the inves-
tor was foreign. But the U.S. government opposed Asian ownership. Why? 
The officially stated reason was “national security.”283 It is true that Fairchild 
had a small number of contracts with the U.S. military.284 But had those con-
tracts been for sensitive technologies, the Defense Department could have 
easily denied those contracts to the Fujitsu-owned entity.285 Moreover, it is 
unlikely that Japan, a close political and military ally, would forbid its com-
panies from selling semiconductors to the United States.286 Indeed, given the 
broader context of the U.S.–Japan military alliance, the fate of a failing sem-
iconductor company would probably not jeopardize U.S. national security.287 
A secondary reason was probably economic nationalism. Japanese compa-
nies were outperforming their U.S. rivals, leading some to believe they would 
decimate the U.S. semiconductor industry. Why, then, “offer up” a U.S. com-
pany to a Japanese competitor? This has some explanatory purchase, but still 
seems inadequate to explain the government’s strong negative reaction. 
Because the differential treatment of European investment forms a core 
part of this Article’s thesis, we reflect upon it for a moment. Congress has, to 
be sure, vocally opposed European investments over the past forty years. To 
 
 281 TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM 5 (2013). See also Timothy Webster, The Legal Prece-
dents of American Orientalism, 62 AM. J COMP. L. 1003 (2014) (reviewing TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL 
ORIENTALISM). 
 282 The Washington Post dispassionately reported that “Fairchild . . . has announced it has agreed to 
be taken over by Schlumberger, which has offered $363 million in cash, or $66 dollars a share, for all of 
Fairchild’s outstanding shares. The bid was accepted at a meeting of the Fairchild board on Saturday.” 
Fairchild, Schlumberger Plan Merger, WASH. POST, May 22, 1979, at E4. 
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take one roughly contemporaneous example to the Fujitsu controversy, Con-
gress resisted the hostile takeover of Goodyear Tires by British investor 
James Goldsmith. In articulating their opposition, members of Congress did 
not view the takeover as part of a larger British conspiracy to re-colonize the 
United States, even though the United States was formerly a British colony. 
Nor did they critique the transaction based on English “national character.” 
Instead, the discussion focused on objections to the particular investor.288 
Even when exchanges became heated,289 members of Congress focused on 
the merits of the investment, and not the investor’s nationality. 
With Japan and other Asian investments, by contrast, Congress asked a 
different set of questions. The Japanese were depicted as hostile, alien, and 
intent to destroy the United States. Members of Congress talked about “the 
Japanese,” but rarely about the company, Fujitsu. They did not view Fujitsu’s 
proposed acquisition as the consequence of independent analysis of its long-
term interests or strategy. Instead, Fujitsu was an appendage of the Japanese 
state, submerged into the “vast, faceless, nameless yellow horde,” as John 
Dower has written.290 Congress thus drew upon the “yellow peril” discourse 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, portraying Asians as col-
lectively-minded and incapable of acting on their own initiative. It also re-
sorted to the Orientalist technique of appealing to abstraction and stereotype, 
as opposed to direct evidence of what this company hoped to achieve. 
Adverse actions followed. Under pressure from the Reagan Administra-
tion, Fujitsu withdrew its bid for Fairchild.291 Administration officials did not 
shy away from expressing anti-Japanese sentiments, including the reaction 
of Deputy United States Trade Representative Mike Smith, described 
 
 288 When English investor James Goldsmith sought a hostile takeover of Goodyear tires in 1986, Con-
gress focused on U.S. securities laws, the long-term interests of Goodyear’s shareholders and employees, 
and the implications for the U.S. economy. Even when congressional testimony turned acrimonious, as it 
did, the focus was on “corporate raiders,” not on the perils of English capitalism. See Stuart Warner, 25 
Years Ago: Driving back the raider at the gates of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., CLEVELAND.COM, 
Nov. 27, 2011; Robert D. Hershey Jr., Goodyear and Sir James Square Off, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1986, 
at D1. Likewise, when the French company Thomson-CSF bid for a U.S.-based missile manufacturer, 
members of Congress opposed the transaction by seizing on national security concerns, partial ownership 
of the company by the French government, and allegations that the company’s alleged violation of U.S. 
export laws by selling lasers to Iraq. See French Firm Drops Its Bid for LTV Missile Unit, ASSOC. PRESS, 
July 7, 1992. 
 289 For example, Congressman John Seiberling, whose grandfather founded Goodyear, denounced the 
takeover by Englishman James Goldsmith. In congressional testimony, Seiberling called the proposed 
acquisition an “assault . . . by the financial community,” and demanded of Goldsmith “Who the hell are 
you?” Mark Potts, Goldsmith Trades Barbs with Critics at Hearing, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1986. Gold-
smith’s English nationality, however, was never taken up as an issue to halt the investment. Id.  
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A READER 194, 198 (Michael L. Kreen ed., 1999). 
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above.292 Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige called the acquisition “re-
ally bad policy.”293 He also recalled unspecified national security concerns 
that Fairchild executives had tried to debunk.294 
The Fujitsu incident also altered the legal framework for foreign invest-
ment in the United States. Both Senator Exon and Congressman Florio, who 
sponsored the Exon-Florio amendment, cited the Fujitsu transaction as the 
primary reason to empower the President to block inbound investments.295 
Congressman Florio specifically linked the Fujitsu takeover with the need to 
protect “national security.”296 But as noted above,297 the shibboleth of na-
tional security cannot be accepted at face value. Instead, residual concerns 
about a powerful Japan seemed to persuade most government officials to op-
pose the Fujitsu transaction, and Japanese investment more broadly. 
 D. Chinese Investment 
Investment from China generated considerable controversy in the 2000s 
and 2010s. Since CNOOC’s unsuccessful bid for Unocal in 2005, Chinese 
investors, private and state-owned, have encountered hostility from both 
Congress and the Cabinet. In articulating their suspicions, U.S. government 
actors largely eschew the racist caricatures of both Middle Eastern investors 
in the 1970s, and Japanese investors in the 1980s. This development probably 
reflects greater cultural sensitivity. Instead, they criticize the “government of 
China,” “communist China” or even “Red China.”298 Of course, Orientalist 
thinking may very well undergird the more anodyne language. 
Yet even before the CNOOC incident, Chinese investment prompted 
concern about “national security.” In 1990, George H.W. Bush used his en-
hanced presidential powers under the Exon-Florio amendment to block a 
Chinese investment. He cited “credible evidence” that the Chinese state-
owned company “might take action that threatens to impair the national se-
curity of the United States.”299 But he did not specify what that evidence was. 
In a letter to Congress, President Bush wrote that the U.S. manufacturer sold 
most of its goods to “a single manufacturer for production of civilian aircraft. 
Some of its machinery is subject to U.S. export controls. It has no contracts 
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with the United States Government involving classified information.”300 In 
other words, MAMCO did not produce sensitive military technology. The 
fact that certain products were subject to export controls should not have sunk 
the deal, as these controls would have prohibited their exportation to China. 
At the time, MAMCO did not actually export anything.301 Many commenta-
tors doubted the national security implications of the investment.302 A more 
likely explanation would pair a longstanding fear of China with a persistent 
antagonism towards government investment in the United States. 
More recently, when CNOOC launched its bid for Unocal, a congres-
sional chorus homed in on the national security implications of the deal.303 
Two members of Congress decried “China’s aggressive tactics to lock up 
energy supplies around the world that are largely dedicated for their own 
use.”304 James Woolsey testified to the House Armed Services Committee 
that CNOOC is “an organ, effectively, of the world’s largest communist dic-
tatorship,” and that its proposed acquisition was part of China’s “national 
strategy of domination of the energy markets and strategic domination of the 
western Pacific.”305 
Several questions arise from this testimony. First, it is unlikely that Un-
ocal’s sale would appreciably disrupt oil supplies. Unocal had proven re-
serves of 1.754 billion barrels of oil,306 out of a world total of 1.292 trillion 
barrels (about 0.0013%).307 Nor was it a major player in the United States 
(ranking tenth).308 Oil is a commodity bought and sold on world markets. It 
is unlikely that changing ownership of such a small percentage of the world 
oil supply could disrupt global markets or U.S. access to oil. Oil as a “national 
security” threat thus appears unlikely. 
 
 300 138 CONG. REC. 761, 05 (1990) (statement of President George H.W. Bush). 
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Instead, one could imagine that the transaction might threaten a broader 
set of U.S. interests. As described above, Unocal had worked with a host of 
unsavory governments around the world. The United States, whether or not 
it helped Unocal do business in these areas, may not have wanted this infor-
mation ending up in the hands of the Chinese government. The issue may fit 
more neatly into a national interest rubric. Yet as James Feinerman and others 
have written,309 CNOOC was a pretty small transaction, the blockage of 
which represented a “protectionist, xenophobic or maybe even racist reac-
tion.”310 
More recently, the U.S. government claimed that Ralls and Huawei’s 
attempted acquisitions would impair national security. In Ralls, the D.C. Cir-
cuit found that President Obama failed to give Ralls the opportunity to view 
or respond to unclassified information, and thus violated its due process 
rights.311 Why did the President force Ralls to divest? We do not know. But 
some suggest presidential suspicion that Ralls might spy on drones, which 
the Navy was developing nearby.312 Such concerns suggest that Ralls, a pri-
vately held company established in Delaware by two Chinese nationals, 
would spy on behalf of the Chinese government. 
As with Japan and Fujitsu, it is wise to separate private companies from 
home governments. The conflation of corporation and country is more plau-
sible with a state-owned or state-controlled entity. But even these enterprises 
do not act so differently from most commercial actors.313 Ralls, on the other 
hand, is a privately-held corporation producing wind turbines. If the wind 
turbines were located too close to a U.S. Naval Base, when exactly did that 
 
 309 See Seven Questions: China and Unocal, FOREIGN. POL’Y (July 1, 2005), http://foreignpol-
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become a problem? The Chinese investors purchased the wind-farm from a 
Greek company, who bought it without causing a major contretemps.314 As 
far as we know, the U.S. government did not oppose the sale of the same 
wind-farm to the Greek company. Yet it strongly opposed the transfer to a 
privately held Asian company. We do not know the exact reason, and the 
government is under no obligation to tell the general public, or the company 
itself. 
In the lawsuit, Ralls did not bring a racial discrimination claim, so the 
D.C. Circuit did not rule on this issue. The court did, however, note “other 
foreign-owned windfarms using foreign-made wind turbines operate without 
governmental interference near the same restricted airspace as the Butter 
Creek projects. We can thus infer . . . mere proximity of [the windfarms] to 
the restricted air space is not the only factor that precipitated the CFIUS Or-
der.”315 
The court, rightly, does not engage in speculation. But we might wonder 
what other factors might have led the Obama Administration to make its de-
cision. Competition in the renewable energy sector? Fear of Asian invest-
ment? Some combination thereof? In the absence of a public explanation, 
suspicions arise on both sides of the Pacific. 
 E. Dubai Ports World 
The evidence of discrimination against Dubai Ports World recalls prior 
discussions of “Arab” investment: derogatory statements based on ethnicity, 
and differential treatment of Arabs and non-Arabs. We have reviewed the 
colorful language members of Congress used to describe a longstanding U.S. 
ally in the Middle East: the devil, a bazaar for terrorist nations, and so on. 
Even the more genteel locutions of Barney Frank rehashed quintessential ste-
reotypes about Arabs:316 people from that “part of the world” cannot be 
trusted to run U.S. ports.317 
Congressman Frank and his fellow members of Congress said nothing 
about DPW’s track record in running ports around the world, or the strategic 
implications for either DPW, or the British company they sought to buy. In-
stead, Congress resorted to stereotyped fallacies about “Arabs.” It also 
treated DPW differently from European counterparts. The company that 
DPW sought to purchase—P&O—was British. No one objected when a Eu-
ropean owner operated U.S. ports. But when the foreign owner was Arab, 
 
 314 Ralls purchased the wind farm project from Greek company TernaUS. See Ralls, 758 F.3d 301, at 
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 315 Id. at 325 (emphasis added). 
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ual within the group. They often form the basis for discriminatory attitudes and actions. See ALI 
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“national security” suddenly emerged as a critical issue. Indeed, most U.S. 
ports are operated or owned by foreign entities, part of a global trend towards 
consolidation in the shipping industry.318 In the case at hand, P&O operated 
24 terminals, out of the 829 available, in six U.S. ports. No publicly available 
evidence indicates DPW suffered security lapses at other ports. The differen-
tial treatment did not elude President George W. Bush, who asked “[w]hy all 
of a sudden a Middle Eastern company is held to a different standard than a 
British one.”319 
Finally, two adverse actions resulted from Congress’s campaign. First, 
Congress passed a law to prohibit DPW from purchasing P&O.320 This may 
be the only time in U.S. history—certainly, recent U.S. history—where Con-
gress forbid a foreign investment by naming the two entities involved.321 The 
link between congressional action and discriminatory behavior could not be 
clearer. Second, one year later, Congress passed another law—the Foreign 
Investment and National Security Act. This law stemmed from the potential 
threat that foreign investment posed to U.S. national security. 
 F. Russian Investment 
A word about Russia is also in order. Would the United States act any 
differently if the investor were Russian instead of Chinese or Japanese? In 
the absence of sizeable Russian investment in the United States, it is difficult 
to say. Even before the United States imposed sanctions in 2014, Russia in-
vested less than either India or Venezuela.322 Still, given the long history of 
animosity between the United States and Russia (and its predecessor, the So-
viet Union), surely the United States would treat Russian investment with the 
same suspicion that it has directed towards Asian investment. Yet, that turns 
out not to be the case. As Obama’s first Commerce Secretary, Democrat Gary 
Locke, stated: 
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I am proud to be able to say that the United States is more receptive 
to foreign investment than any other country in the world. No pro-
posed Russian investment in the United States has been rejected, and, 
in fact, Russian companies have made very significant investments in 
areas such as steel, mining and retail petroleum. These investments 
benefit the United States, as well as Russia.323 
Locke also mentioned cooperative arrangements between “Boeing, 
Motorola, and Microsoft, and their Russian partners.”324 Locke’s predecessor 
under the George W. Bush administration, Commerce Secretary Carlos 
Gutierrez, made similar overtures to Russian companies in the U.S. gas sec-
tor.325 Even in sensitive sectors such as oil, aviation, and advanced technol-
ogy, the United States has expressed willingness to work with Russian com-
panies, despite almost a century of antagonism. 
Of course, one cannot rule out the possibility that the United States 
would oppose a particular Russian investment. If that were the case, political 
actors would likely point to the long history of mistrust between Russia and 
the United States, Russia’s destabilizing invasions of Crimea and Georgia, 
its support for the Syrian regime, or the clash of values of our two political 
systems. They would probably not talk about Russian ethnicity, clannishness, 
or lack of sophistication, as they did for Middle Eastern, Japanese and Chi-
nese investors. 
 V. PROTECTING ASIAN INVESTMENT 
In prior parts, this Article has outlined a series of discriminatory actions 
involving Asian investment. We have seen the harm this causes: both in terms 
of forgone foreign investment, and to the image of the United States as both 
racially tolerant and open to foreign investment. This final Part asks what, if 
anything, can be done about it.326 Anti-Asian sentiment has circulated in pub-
lic, political, and legal discourses for almost two centuries. It is unlikely that 
any one form of redress will extirpate such deeply held suspicions. 
I offer two possible ways to mitigate some of the harm discussed above. 
Part IV.A offers ways to improve the CFIUS review process, in particular to 
make that opaque body more transparent and less subject to political or racial 
bias. Part IV.B takes a page from international investment law and urges the 
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adoption of pre-entry national treatment, which will ensure that foreign in-
vestors receive treatment equal to that enjoyed by domestic ones. 
 A. CFIUS: Improving Transparency 
For the past several decades, CFIUS has largely served its mandate of 
permissively screening foreign investment. When active, formally and oth-
erwise, foreign investment has frequently hailed from Asia. CFIUS was not 
simply created to monitor “Middle Eastern” investment. CFIUS was also a 
reaction to Japanese investment in the 1980s. Even if the concern was only 
economic nationalism (and that seems dubious), the language used to de-
scribe the Japanese threat drew on Orientalism. In 1990, President Bush di-
vested CITIC, the Chinese aviation state-owned enterprise, again on CFIUS’ 
guidance. In the late 2000s and early 2010s, CFIUS blocked several Chinese 
technology investments. It also recommended divestiture in Ralls. One could 
probably not establish a housing or employment discrimination claim based 
on such scant evidence.327 Yet the paucity of reliable information on CFIUS 
feeds the perception that the United States disfavors Asian investors. A more 
transparent CFIUS process, reporting more fully to the investor and public, 
could help address this gap. 
Under the 2007 FINSA, CFIUS annually reports to Congress.328 The 
expurgated version of that report is publicly available, but offers incomplete 
information about investment activity, such as the number of investigations 
conducted by CFIUS, the investor’s home country, industry, and other statis-
tics.329 It does not, however, link the number of investigations to a particular 
country. Thus, one cannot discern whether CFIUS investigates Chinese com-
panies at a higher rate than European companies. 
The annual report does produce at least one statistical incongruity. From 
2011 to 2013, Chinese companies filed 54 notices, more than any other coun-
try.330 Considering the small amount of Chinese investment in the United 
States during that period—just 0.3% (three-tenths of one percent) of all 
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FDI—this number assumes additional significance.331 U.K. companies filed 
49 notices, but accounted for 18% of inbound investment, sixty times more 
than China.332 In other words, Chinese companies approach the U.S. market 
with caution, likely due to the heightened scrutiny CFIUS and Congress have 
directed at Chinese investment. 
The opacity of CFIUS procedure has come under criticism. How can we 
pry open the “black box?”333 Many improvements are imaginable, but we 
narrow our inquiry to three.334 First, the CFIUS review process is rigorous. 
Guidance is available, either in the form of Treasury guidelines or the legal 
counsel of a fancy Washington law firm.335 Without such guidance, the in-
vestor may fail to “articulate, early on, a clear and consistent rationale for the 
transaction.”336 As one former CFIUS staff member put it, the “rules are in-
tentionally ambiguous to afford regulators maximum discretion.”337 In part, 
that discretion helps protect CFIUS’s classified intelligence assessment. But 
it also provides some cover when the Committee disapproves of a transaction 
but fails to articulate the reason why. 
Second, foreign investors may need more information than the govern-
ment provides. In Ralls, the D.C. Circuit found that the Obama Administra-
tion failed to provide material information to Ralls, thereby violating its due 
process rights.338 In prosecutorial terms, CFIUS failed to hand over material 
evidence to Ralls, arguably preventing the company from understanding the 
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in the United States on a Historical-Cost Basis, 2013, https://www.bea.gov/international/di1fdibal.htm. 
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 333 See, e.g., Jose W. Fernandez, Lessons from the Trenches, INT’L FIN. L. REV., July/Aug. 2014, at 
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rect Investment after the Dubai Ports Controversy: Has the U.S. Government Finally Figured Out how to 
Balance Foreign Threats to National Security Without Alienating Foreign Companies?, 34 J. CORP. L. 
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 335 See Notice, Dep’t of Treasury, Office of investment Security; Guidance Concerning the National 
Security Review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. 74568 (Dec. 
8, 2008). 
 336 Fernandez, supra note 333, at 45. 
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 338 Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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national security implications of its acquisition. Since CFIUS is both prose-
cutor (compiling evidence) and judge (making decisions based on that evi-
dence), its failure to share evidence casts doubt on its ability to act inde-
pendently. It is critical, then, to ensure that the foreign investor has a 
meaningful opportunity to see, analyze and rebut the evidence that CFIUS 
has gathered.339 
Third, once CFIUS renders its decision, investors have no way to chal-
lenge it. Indeed, the Exon-Florio amendments specifically preclude judicial 
review of the President’s decision.340 Ralls revealed that courts can review 
CFIUS procedure to ensure certain constitutional rights of due process. The 
introduction of an appeals mechanism, either within CFIUS itself or in an 
outside body, such as federal courts, would ensure that CFIUS decisions have 
a firm factual basis, and do not result from political or racial ructions of the 
day. Federal judicial review of agency actions is common in many areas of 
the law, and courts are well equipped to handle sensitive or confidential in-
formation.341 
 B. Congress: Acts and Omissions 
Congress also has a role to play. First, its members should understand 
the importance of foreign investment in the United States generally and in 
their respective districts specifically. Scarcely a week goes by without news 
of another Chinese investment in the United States, and not just in the major 
markets such as New York or California.342 If Congress understood the extent 
to which foreign investment benefited their constituencies—through jobs, re-
search and development, economic activity and secondary effects (services 
catering to the employees)—they may find it harder to oppose foreign invest-
ment.343 
In this respect, a recent report by the National Committee on U.S.–China 
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Relations and the Rhodium Group is instructive.344 The report tracks fourteen 
years of Chinese foreign direct investment into each of the 435 congressional 
districts. To be sure, China remains a comparatively small investor in the 
United States—twentieth in the world, holding 0.3% of total FDI in the 
United States.345 Yet Chinese investors employ about 80,000 U.S. workers 
and spend hundreds of millions of dollars in research and development an-
nually.346 They have invested in a diverse array of sectors, including oil, tech-
nology, and renewable energy—the very sectors that Congress and CFIUS 
warned about in prior years. Yet, as far as we know, no company has shut 
down, no terrorist attacks have occurred, and no trade secrets have been sto-
len. This Article may help U.S. politicians realize that Chinese investment, 
properly screened, can serve the same useful purposes that foreign invest-
ment has traditionally played in the United States. 
Second, Congress could also consider providing additional investment 
protections through legislation. Since nations enjoy autonomy to regulate for-
eign investment on their own terms, the legislature can decide how to treat 
foreign investors. The national treatment standard demands equal treatment 
for both the foreign and domestic investor.347 The foreign investor should not 
encounter discrimination in market access, applicable laws, access to justice, 
due process, and so on. In most investment treaties,348 the national treatment 
obligation arises after the host state formally approves the investment.349 This 
post-entry model preserves the state’s strong gatekeeping function regarding 
foreign investment. It simply prohibits objectionable foreign investors from 
entering the market in the first place. 
The North American model, also known as pre-entry national treatment, 
accords equal treatment to foreign investors when they acquire the interest, 
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even if the state has not specifically authorized it.350 That is, the state cedes 
regulatory autonomy in many fields, usually spelled out in a treaty appendix 
or “negative list.” The default setting is that foreign investors enjoy the “right 
of entry” or “right to establish” in the host state.351 Corporations enjoy en-
hanced autonomy under pre-entry national treatment. The state has, in effect, 
approved the investment and agreed not to discriminate against them. 
The United States has made pre-entry national treatment a cornerstone 
of its foreign investment policy for decades. Beginning with its 1983 model 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”), all U.S. BITs require pre-entry national 
treatment of the partner country.352 Because pre-entry national treatment is a 
product of treaty law, and Congress must ratify investment treaties, Congress 
has the power to extend this protection. The United States could extend pre-
entry national treatment to all foreign investors—even in the absence of a 
bilateral investment treaty. This would bring the United States’ own practice 
far closer to the goal of universalizing pre-entry national treatment. It would 
also provide a legal guarantee to the long held mantra of openness to foreign 
investment. 
Were the U.S. government to deny a foreign investor national treatment, 
a remedy could take one of several forms. If CFIUS or Congress interferes 
with a foreign investment without a legally compelling justification, a court 
could grant declaratory relief (e.g. the investor’s rights were violated), in-
junctive relief (requiring CFIUS to take action, and perhaps even authorizing 
the investment), or monetary damages (lost profits or otherwise). Such pro-
tections may not prevent another Dubai Ports World or CNOOC situation. 
They might, however, provide legal remedies to foreign investors and signal 
to the political branches that their authority to regulate investment has limits. 
In the long run, the United States is unlikely to offer pre-entry national 
treatment to foreign investors in the absence of a treaty. Unless the United 
States gains national treatment from a partner country, there is no reason why 
it would offer something for nothing. To be sure, the United States is capable 
of acting unilaterally, particularly if long-term commercial interests are at 
stake.353 Congress has the ability to do this, either by passing a law like the 
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FCPA, or by serially ratifying BITs with pre-entry national treatment provi-
sions. However, Congress does not appear quite as attached to pre-entry na-
tional treatment as it has been to other principles of commercial law. 
 VI. CONCLUSION 
One frequently hears that the United States is the “most hospitable coun-
try” towards forward direct investment. This Article does not dislodge the 
broad thrust of that claim. Instead, it shows how U.S. law of foreign invest-
ment grew out of several responses to Asian investment, and that this re-
sponse was not based solely on objective or political criteria like economic 
nationalism or national security. The evidence, pieced together from the 
1970s to the 2000s, punctuates this notion of U.S. openness. 
We know U.S. treatment of Asian investment has not always been equal 
to that of Western investment. As a recent Chinese article summarized: 
Although the U.S. is one of the world’s most open markets, its security 
review process for foreign investment is particularly stringent. For 
Chinese companies especially, the U.S.’s national security review 
seems to wear “tinted glasses.” From the early defeat of CNOOC’s 
bid for Unocal and Huawei’s thwarted attempts to invest in the U.S., 
to the recent failure by Sany to invest in wind farms, Chinese investors 
face especially interesting security barriers in U.S. mergers and acqui-
sitions.354 
At the present moment, many Chinese investors suspect that the United 
States opposes Chinese investment. Indeed, Daniel Chow surmises that 
China’s interest in BITs stems in large part from its frustration with U.S. 
barriers to Chinese investment.355 How can we make sense of the United 
States’ current unease with Chinese investment, and the past four decades of 
opposition to Asian investment? Three factors help make sense of this his-
tory. 
First, national security—whose implication is highly implausible in 
most instances—plays a role. With advances in cybersecurity, one cannot 
know ex ante the extent to which an acquisition may disrupt U.S. national 
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security. Precisely for this reason, CFIUS has a thorough, though opaque, 
vetting process. 
Second, economic concerns reverberate throughout these discussions. 
As noted, investments from certain Asian jurisdictions—South Korea, Tai-
wan, and Singapore, for example—attract little of the umbrage reserved for 
China, Japan, and certain Middle Eastern jurisdictions. This animosity stems 
from a fear that the United States is slipping, losing its international prestige, 
or fading into obscurity. This is not true as an empirical matter; the United 
States continues to enjoy the “pole position” in the global prestige race. But 
perceptions frequently overshadow the truth. The thought of receiving “re-
verse investment,” and of somehow being subjugated to economic forces 
originating from Asia, still bothers many people from the United States and 
some U.S. politicians. A similar anxiety does not attach to investments from 
Germany, the United Kingdom, or France, the fourth, fifth and sixth largest 
economies, respectively. This leads to the final point. 
Third, race and national origin still matter. Having analyzed an array of 
statements, actions and decisions rendered by government officials over four 
decades, this Article still observes special censure for investors from Asia. 
Westerners, even now, account for the overwhelming majority of inbound 
foreign investment. Yet Chinese investment—tiny by comparison—still ran-
kles. U.S. politicians often react to Chinese investment, whether in pork man-
ufacturing or computer software, with a suspiciousness in large part dispro-
portionate to the actual threat. The language of opposition to Asian 
investment has grown less strident from the 1970s and 1980s to the present. 
But the underlying discomfort with a powerful, economically strong and in-
ternationally active Asia persists. 
Many predict that the twenty-first century will belong to “Asia,” as 
Asian countries gain wealth, power, military strength, and other capacities. 
This rise need not come at the expense of the United States, any more than 
the United States’ own rise impoverished Germany, Britain, or France. If 
people from the United States can avoid reflexive reactions to Asian invest-
ment, the United States may actually live up to its reputation for receptivity 
to foreign capital. That would pose a model for the rest of the world. 
 
